[...] USA is increasing its commitment to drone warfare without regard for the risks these weapons pose to our security and moral standing in the world. Drone technology is spreading rapidly, with dozens of countries and even nonstate actors such as Hezbollah now developing or purchasing these systems. Military planners are developing autonomous drones that could make their own decisions on when to unleash lethal force. If other nations follow our example as they often do, we will soon face the prospect of a world in which terror can rain down from the sky at any moment without warning. There is no long-term benefit to the United States in the unchecked proliferation of drone weapons or in the absence of agreed standards for limiting their use. [...]

The United States should work through the United Nations to convene an international conference for developing legal standards on the use of unmanned weapons. The goal should be to ensure that any military use of these systems complies fully with the laws of war, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. This would enhance our moral standing and strengthen U.S. and international security.

http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/09/david-cortright/license-to-kill

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UN chief Ban Ki-moon

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Obama on #Libya

Today [Saturday] I authorized the Armed Forces of the United States to begin a limited military action in Libya in support of an international effort to protect Libyan civilians. That action has now begun.

In this effort, the United States is acting with a broad coalition that is committed to enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which calls for the protection of the Libyan people. That coalition met in Paris today to send a unified message, and it brings together many of our European and Arab partners.

This is not an outcome that the United States or any of our partners sought. Even yesterday, the international community offered Muammar Qaddafi the opportunity to pursue an immediate cease-fire, one that stopped the violence against civilians and the advances of Qaddafi’s forces. But despite the hollow words of his government, he has ignored that opportunity. His attacks on his own people have continued. His forces have been on the move. And the danger faced by the people of Libya has grown.

I am deeply aware of the risks of any military action, no matter what limits we place on it. I want the American people to know that the use of force is not our first choice and it’s not a choice that I make lightly. But we cannot stand idly by when a tyrant tells his people that there will be no mercy, and his forces step up their assaults on cities like Benghazi and Misurata, where innocent men and women face brutality and death at the hands of their own government.

So we must be clear: Actions have consequences, and the writ of the international community must be enforced. That is the cause of this coalition.

As a part of this effort, the United States will contribute our unique capabilities at the front end of the mission to protect Libyan civilians, and enable the enforcement of a no-fly zone that will be led by our international partners. And as I said yesterday, we will not — I repeat — we will not deploy any U.S. troops on the ground.

As Commander-in-Chief, I have great confidence in the men and women of our military who will carry out this mission. They carry with them the respect of a grateful nation.

I’m also proud that we are acting as part of a coalition that includes close allies and partners who are prepared to meet their responsibility to protect the people of Libya and uphold the mandate of the international community.

I’ve acted after consulting with my national security team, and Republican and Democratic leaders of Congress. And in the coming hours and days, my administration will keep the American people fully informed. But make no mistake: Today we are part of a broad coalition. We are answering the calls of a threatened people. And we are acting in the interests of the United States and the world.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/20/remarks-president-libya-today-we-are-part-broad-coalition-we-are-answering-calls-thr

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US Ambassador: Over-Focus On Development “Will Kill” WIPO: “The World Intellectual Property Organization is headed in a controversial direction, and a focus on development at the expense of protection of intellectual property rights will mean the end of the agency, the United States Ambassador Betty King said yesterday. [...]” http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/12/17/us-ambassador-over-focus-on-development-will-kill-wipo/

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“[...] Scientific American has run a poll of its readers on climate change. Remember that SciAm has been shilling for the climate apocalypse for years [...]

SciAm probably expected a lot of people would agree with the key statement in their poll that the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is “an effective group of government representatives and other experts.”

Hardly. As of this morning, only 16% of the 6655 respondents agreed. 84%—that is not a typo—described the IPCC as “a corrupt organization, prone to groupthink, with a political agenda.”

The poll also asks “What should we do about climate change?” 69% say “nothing, we are powerless to stop it.” When asked about policy options, an astonishingly low 7% support cap-and-trade, which passed the U.S. House of Representatives in June, 2009, and cost approximately two dozen congressmen their seats.

The real killer is question “What is causing climate change?” For this one, multiple answers are allowed. 26% said greenhouse gases from human activity, 32% solar variation, and 78% “natural processes.” (In reality all three are causes of climate change.)

And finally, “How much would you be willing to pay to forestall the risk of catastrophic climate change?” 80% of the respondents said “nothing.”

Remember that this comes from what is hardly a random sample. Scientific American is a reliably statist publication and therefore appeals to a readership that is skewed to the left of the political center. This poll demonstrates that virtually everyone now acknowledges that the UN has corrupted climate science, that climate change is impossible to stop, and that futile attempts like cap-and-trade do nothing but waste money and burn political capital [...]”

http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/the-shocking-truth-the-scientific-american-poll-on-climate-change/

Original: https://www.surveymonkey.com/sr.aspx?sm=ONSUsVTBSpkC_2f2cTnptR6w_2fehN0orSbxLH1gIA03DqU_3d

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Statement by H.E. Archbishop Silvano M. Tomasi, Permanent Representative of the Holy See to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva at the 48th Series of Meetings of the World Intellectual Property Organization’s General Assemblies, Geneva, 21 September 2010:

“Mr. President,

[...]

The adoption of stronger IPRs in developing countries is often defended by claims that this reform will attract significant new inflows of technology, a blossoming of local innovation and cultural industries, and a faster closing of the technology gap between developing and developed countries. It must be recognized, however, that improved IPRs by itself is highly unlikely to produce such benefits.

The increase of benefits deriving to countries from IPRs depends on their ability to absorb and develop technologies and new products. In this context, three issues are critical for development purposes. First, it is clear that the ability to adapt new technologies to local industrial uses is improved if it meets with high levels of education and an adequate qualified human capital. Thus, there are important payoffs in providing access to technical training and secondary or university education. Second, the absorption of foreign technologies to enhance productivity, in a critical way, depends on the Research and Development (R&D) performance of local enterprises. This observation points to the importance of developing an effective technology policy for promoting technical change in domestic enterprises. Such programs could include technology demonstration projects, information sharing through conferences, the encouragement of research, joint ventures, and improved linkages between public research institutes and enterprises.

Third, in many countries a relevant problem is the inability of research institutes to bring their inventions to market in a useful way. Stronger IPRs alone would help in this context, but so also would development contracts between institutes and enterprises with defined ownership shares and increased flexibility for researchers to form new business concerns. Last but not least, it is also important for countries to encourage the development of financial markets in such a way that they become capable of managing the significant risks involved in technology development.

Mr. President,

These few observations want to underline the conviction that the main goal of the international community in developing a fair regime of intellectual property rights should aim toward the good of all, the pursuit of more equitable international relations, especially with regard to poorer and more vulnerable people. Of this goal we are reminded by Pope Benedict’s latest Encyclical Letter [, 22.]: “…in the context of immaterial or cultural causes of development and underdevelopment, we find these same patterns of responsibility reproduced. On the part of rich countries there is excessive zeal for protecting knowledge through an unduly rigid assertion of the right to intellectual property, especially in the field of health care. At the same time, in some poor countries, cultural models and social norms of behaviour persist which hinder the process of development.””

http://nunzio-un.blogspot.com/2010/10/statement-by-h.html

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Digital Economy Act: This means war “With the rushed passage into law of the Digital Economy Act this month [cf. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/tag/debill ], the fight over copyright enters a new phase. Previous to this, most copyfighters operated under the rubric that a negotiated peace was possible between the thrashing entertainment giants and civil society.

But now that the BPI and its mates have won themselves the finest law that money can buy – a law that establishes an unprecedented realm of web censorship in Britain, a law that provides for the disconnection of entire families from the net on the say-so of an entertainment giant, a law that shuts down free Wi-Fi hotspots and makes it harder than ever to conduct your normal business on the grounds that you might be damaging theirs – the game has changed. [...]

Parliament has just given two fingers to me (and every other small/medium digital enterprise) by agreeing to cripple Britain’s internet in order to give higher profits to the analogue economy represented by the labels and studios. [...]

Elements of this agenda are also on display (or rather, in hiding) in the secret Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement [cf. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/tag/acta ], a treaty being drafted between a member’s club of rich nations. They’ve turned their back on the United Nations to negotiate in private, without having to contend with journalists or public interest groups. By their own admission, they intend to impose this treaty on poor countries as a condition of ongoing trade, and in the US, the Obama administration has announced its intention to pass ACTA without Congressional debate. [...]

I am enough of a techno-pessimist to believe that baking surveillance, control and censorship into the very fabric of our networks, devices and laws is the absolute road to dictatorial hell.” Cory Doctorow, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/apr/16/digital-economy-act-cory-doctorow

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“The issue with terrorists getting nukes is not what they have done in the past (zero) but how rapidly it can change the risk profile when they do use a nuke. Scenario: terrorists use a nuclear device on a major city in the US and kill 1 million. This makes the new annual fatality risk in the US equal to 1/300 which is comparable to WWII at the top of the chart.” Vs. “Scenario: Everybody eats cake. Saying it might happen does not a risk analysis make.”:) Comments of Omar Fink and arturus on http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/04/terrorist_attac.html

“Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan

MR. BRENNAN:  Good afternoon, everyone.  The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, it is serious, it is growing, and it constitutes one of the greatest threats to our national security and, indeed, to global security.
Over the past two decades there has been indisputable evidence that dozens of terrorist groups have actively sought some type of weapon of mass effect.  Relative to other such potential weapons — which include biological, chemical, radiological — the consequences and impact of a nuclear attack would be the most devastating as well as the most lasting.

Thus, the ability to obtain a nuclear weapon and to use it is the ultimate and most prized goal of terrorist groups. 

Al Qaeda is especially notable for its longstanding interest in acquiring weapons-useable nuclear material and the requisite expertise that would allow it to develop a yield producing improvised nuclear device.

Al Qaeda has been engaged in the effort to acquire a nuclear weapon for over 15 years, and its interest remains strong today. 

[...]

Q    First, Mr. Brennan, if you could clarify again this ongoing threat that you were talking about from these terrorist groups, al Qaeda, is there anything specific now that intelligence is telling you that this threat exists — not just general threat over the last 10 years or the last 5 years, but anything actively going on now that intelligence can point to?

MR. BRENNAN:  I think you can point to a lot of al Qaeda activities and public statements that underscore their determination to carry out attacks against U.S., Western interests, as well as the interests of other countries and nations.  And there is a significant amount of intelligence that underlies those statements and those assessments that are public.

Al Qaeda has demonstrated this determination and also extreme patience in going after particular types of capabilities.  And we know for certain that there are individuals that have been within al Qaeda that have been given this responsibility.  This is a very, very tough challenge though for us to be able to look worldwide to see where al Qaeda might be undertaking biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear programs.

And so there is intelligence that indicates that al Qaeda continues its murderous agenda and continues to look toward WMD capabilities in order to carry out that agenda.

[...]

MR. BRENNAN:  [Discussions have] been taking place over the past 15 months at the expert level to identify all the parts of the broader nuclear security architecture that we really need to make sure is as strong as possible.

Q    But those commitments are non-binding, are they not?  I mean, there’s no general enforcement mechanism or enforcement out there.  These are agreements that nations to made to each other.  What is the means by which to check to verify that these commitments are being met?

MR. GIBBS:  Well, I can assure you that over the course of the next two years, as I said, the United States will provide whatever technical assistance is necessary to ensure that the movement of very dangerous and not easy to handle material — that that’s accomplished.  I mean, Major, look, there’s — we’re not signing any formal mechanism today, but I would say the commitments made between those two leaders, the President feels confident in — in understanding as well what we’ll then begin to  provide, along with other nations in the world, for the ability to lock this stuff down.

[…]

Q    Just to follow up on the previous questions about the timing, should they get possession of this material, how long would it take a group like al Qaeda to produce weapon?  I mean, is there any estimate?  Because it seems not a very easy process anyway.  Look at Iran and, you know, it’s taking years.  So what is your assessment in terms of timing?

MR. BRENNAN:  Well, I’ve talked before about the various weapons of mass effect, whether it be biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear.  Radiological, a dirty bomb — this is a way that al Qaeda could try to carry out a nuclear-type event, but it wouldn’t have — it wouldn’t produce a yield; it wouldn’t be a nuclear blast.
So those materials may be available –

Q    (Inaudible.)

MR. BRENNAN:  Mass effect — well, you can have the psychological effects that are attendant to some type of WMD attack.  And so a chemical attack, a biological attack, you can have tremendous effect, but the destruction in terms of lives might be limited.  A nuclear attack, though, an improvised nuclear device, and that’s probably the way they would go as they — if they were able to acquire this fissile material, a lot depends on the material they were able to get, the expertise that they had, but I think they would be damned determined to try to move in that direction.  They have already said publicly that if they acquired that type of weapons capability, that they would use it.
I don’t want to test the proposition of that — that they would take a certain period of time to create such a weapon.  What we want to do is, again, try to focus on denying them the opportunity to use those materials for weapons of mass effect purposes.

MR. GIBBS:  Yes, sir.

Q    (Inaudible) — terms of vulnerability, military, nuclear sides to the civil nuclear energy sector.  What gives you the bigger concerns, that somebody steals nuclear weapons from a military site worldwide?  Or rather, let’s say, hijack, for example, the transport of highly enriched based?  Which is often transported (inaudible) — cities all over the world.  What’s the bigger concern?

MR. BRENNAN:  Well, we have concerns both on the civilian and military side from the standpoint of facilities as well as transport as well as the security measures that are put in place at these respective facilities.  Al Qaeda and other groups, including criminal groups, are going to be looking for what avenues present them the best opportunity to acquire these materials.  And so they and a lot of these criminal gangs and terrorist organizations reside in countries where there are nuclear programs, including some that are part of nuclear weapons programs.
And so what we’re trying to do is to make sure that we’re able to stay several steps ahead of terrorist groups by working with these countries to make sure that they’re able to button down their facilities, but also take the appropriate steps and to institute the protocols that are necessary that will endure over time.  This is not just a one-time event here — what we’re trying to do is continue this process that’s been underway for a number of years that we can truly help to safeguard these materials.

Q    Every day tons are transported worldwide.  Tons.

[Cf. Testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President Federation of American Scientists before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations March 6, 2002 http://fas.org/ssp/docs/kelly_testimony_030602.pdf ]

MR. BRENNAN:  A lot of things are transported on a regular basis.  What we need to do is to make sure that it’s done in the most secure fashion possible.  And that’s what part of the dialogue that is taking place with other countries to ensure that as they move materials they are doing it fully aware of the vulnerabilities and the potential opportunities that terrorists might use to take advantage of that transport.

[…]

Q    Why not going through the United Nations for — there is a convention on protection of nuclear materials.  It is kind of creating a parallel mechanism.

MR. GIBBS:  I’m sorry, say the second part again.

Q    You’re creating a parallel mechanism.

[Cf. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/482

MR. GIBBS:  No, I don’t — again, we’re — 46 countries are represented here, as well as a series of international organizations that the President believes are necessary to do this.  So I don’t think in any way this is duplicative.  I think the President sees the strong concern for — and John reiterated the type of — the President reiterated the threat, John reiterated the types of groups that are seeking to control this type of material.  And I think the President strongly believes that we must do everything in our power and that that is certainly not duplicative of what the United Nations seeks to do.”

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/briefing-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-and-assistant-president-counterterrorism-and-

Key documents: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/13/enormously-productive-day

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Institution without an address

The PSI was designed to address what many consider to be the top security threat to the United States, its allies, and world peace: the acquisition or use of WMD by terrorists or rogue states. It was launched on May 31, 2003, by the United States, after President George W. Bush declared, “When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them.” Initially, 11 countries joined the PSI, but the number of participants grew rapidly; more than 90 countries now take part, including France, Russia, and the United Kingdom (but not China). These states share intelligence, patrol the seas, and interdict ships that are suspected of carrying nuclear contraband. They have also attempted to expand these measures to international airspace.

Unlike most international organizations, the PSI has no headquarters or secretariat, no charter or rules. It has participants, not members. The U.S. State Department refers to the PSI as an “activity.” Plenary meetings are rare, and there are calls to make them even less frequent. The PSI has no council in which one member can exercise veto power. It has no multistate committees that must unanimously approve each target, as was the case for a while for NATO during its bombing operations in Kosovo in 1999. And it has no bureaucracy that must be paid for and monitored and that may hinder action with red tape, turf wars, or office politics.

Theoretically, each PSI participant acts on its own, sharing information and coordinating its actions with the others, especially those with navies in the relevant places. In effect, however, the PSI is led by the United States, the only country with a truly global navy, which then works with its major allies, other major powers, and a considerable number of small countries. […] it acts as a single standing global antiproliferation force led by one nation, with a rotating cast of volunteers joining the patrols and raids. The PSI is also unlike the coalitions that intervened in Iraq in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999. These were ad hoc efforts tailored to one situation and limited in duration, whereas the PSI functions continuously. In a world with no central government, the PSI provides a rudimentary police force.

The standby and operational nature of the PSI is what gives it strength. Compare the preparations necessary for a PSI mission with the steps needed to take similar measures the old-fashioned way: first, any such action might well have required the approval of the UN Security Council (which could have taken years to secure, if it was secured at all); then, a budget for the mission would have to have been secured; finally, the necessary troops would need to have been assembled and transported to the theater of operation. The PSI anticipates all these steps. It frequently holds joint training operations to work out in advance how countries will coordinate a mission.

It is difficult to gauge the ultimate effectiveness of the PSI, but it has been successfully employed about a dozen times already. [...]

Too legit to quit?

An effective international system relies on a combination of military force and legitimacy–on hard and soft power. The PSI’s special merit is that it commands not only a very considerable level of hard power but also a fair amount of legitimacy. The Bush administration was widely criticized for its wanton disregard for international (and domestic) laws and norms. In the case of the PSI, however, it followed a rather different course, taking pains to ensure that the initiative was consistent with international law.

The challenge the PSI first faced was the basic, international legal and normative precept that ships have the right of uninhibited passage in international waters and the right of “innocent passage” through national territorial waters. At the same time, the very goal of the PSI requires interventions that appeared at first to conflict with these long-established normative and legal concepts. But existing international law did provide some leeway. Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea outlines the circumstances under which the passage of a ship is considered “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.” Transporting nuclear contraband could qualify.

The PSI acquired another layer of international legitimacy in 2004, from UN Security Council Resolution 1540 [pdf], which calls on all states to take efforts against the proliferation of WMD. [...]

To further square itself with international law, the PSI draws heavily on bilateral agreements between the United States and “flag of convenience” states–countries, such as Liberia and Panama, where a large portion of the world’s biggest ships are registered for the sake of low taxes and lax regulations. [...] By 2007, the United States had such agreements with the Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, the Marshall Islands, and Mongolia.
[...]

A model to copy

The PSI should be strengthened. Legal scholars should further develop the normative and legal rationales behind the PSI with the hope that transporting nuclear contraband across national borders will come to be viewed as such a gross violation of international security that it will be considered legal for any nation to use most any means to prevent it. Indeed, it has been suggested that such an act should be considered akin to slavery and piracy, two activities that have long been deemed to warrant violating the notion that ships should be free from interference on the high seas and be allowed innocent passage through territorial waterways.

Because of a mix of self-serving and altruistic motives, the United Kingdom promoted the norm to ban the transnational transport of slaves beginning in the late eighteenth century. As a consensus grew around it throughout the first part of the nineteenth century, the ban was gradually ensconced in custom, and a license to interdict ships that were suspected of transporting slaves became part of international law.
[...]

Both the legitimacy and the military power of the PSI would be buttressed if the group’s mission and composition were expanded. So far, the PSI has been largely limited to the seas; PSI participants should move to also interdict nuclear contraband transported by air and land. […]

The PSI model could be applied to other international efforts — such as armed humanitarian interventions, emergency disaster relief, or campaigns to prevent the spread of epidemics — thus adding new building blocks to a new global architecture. At least one recent effort appears to be designed like the PSI. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which was launched in 2006 by the United States and Russia and now counts 75 participants, aims to improve international cooperation in tracking nuclear terrorists and securing fissile material.

The limited expansion of international norms and laws, backed up by the military forces of major countries, may well transform the PSI into an ever more acceptable and capable standing global force. An expanded PSI could be an important element of a significantly more effective, and yet still legitimate, new global security architecture. Policymakers seeking to confront new challenges are right to call for new forms of governance to update today’s outmoded intergovernmental system. True, the PSI provides only one model for that system, a system that will have to be pieced together from a variety of elements. But when considering a framework for the future, it would be a mistake to ignore the precedent of the PSI.

Amitai Etzioni

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