Charles Johnson

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“tribal communities are the default system of human social nature. Humanity evolved that way for millennia after exiting the hunter-gatherer band stage of social life. Many of the planet’s diverse societies have since moved on toward becoming modern states, but not all of them have. And even for those that have, the shadowy emotional residues of the distant past remain; we never lose anything in evolution, but instead add new developments to older ones. That is Fox’s central idea and the theme running through The Tribal Imagination.

It is also a truth, Fox believes, that we ignore at our peril as we go stumbling about in far-away strange places where tribes rule with an authority denied the more-or-less absent state. The pride and latent violence of groups of mutually suspicious kindred must be the starting point, Fox says, for anyone venturing into this political landscape. Such men and women are not the free individual citizens of a recognized territorial jurisdiction; nor are they people with clearly defined and defensible legal rights with respect to the state, whether in Libya or Iraq or Afghanistan.

This truth, he says, sheds a harsh light on instances when “our leaders make claims about human nature and the natural state of human society as justifications for political action, armed intervention included.” These leaders, more often than not, suggests Fox, simply refuse to understand the essentially tribal nature of the lands they hope to remake. They are reluctant to grasp that

there is no ‘Iraqi People’. The phrase should be banned as misleading and purely rhetorical. . . . What is not understood is that Iraq, like the other countries of the region, still stands at a level of social evolution where the family, clan, tribe and sect command major allegiance. The idea of the individual autonomous voter, necessary and commonplace in our own systems, is relatively foreign.

Numerous unforeseen events during the Iraq occupation have illustrated the priority of tribal authority. When men came out and stole copper wire connecting hospitals to the electricity grid, indignant U.S. soldiers tried to make the thieves see that their actions would hurt “the Iraqi people.” True to form, the thieves responded just as Aouda had a hundred years before: Who were these “Iraqi people”, they wanted to know, whose claims outranked those of their own needy relatives? The thieving clansmen felt no responsibility for some mythical collectivity called “the people” that, as far as they knew, did not include them and that, in any case, foreigners had invented without their approval. In contrast, they were absolutely bound by customary law to help their kin” http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=990

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Government internet control increases online radicalisation – LulzSec is not an isolated phenomenon http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/28/radical-hackers-lulzsec-governments

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Policing the Police: Apps That Let You Spy on the Cops http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/06/policing-the-police-the-apps-that-let-you-spy-on-the-cops/240916/

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How to exit the euro – a proposal from 1997 http://moslereconomics.com/2011/05/16/how-to-exit-the-euro-a-proposal-from-1997/

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All complex systems contain parasites. In any system of cooperative behavior, an uncooperative strategy will be effective — and the system will tolerate the uncooperatives — as long as they’re not too numerous or too effective. Thus, as a species evolves cooperative behavior, it also evolves a dishonest minority that takes advantage of the honest majority. If individuals within a species have the ability to switch strategies, the dishonest minority will never be reduced to zero. As a result, the species simultaneously evolves two things: 1) security systems to protect itself from this dishonest minority, and 2) deception systems to successfully be parasitic.

Humans evolved along this path. The basic mechanism can be modeled simply. It is in our collective group interest for everyone to cooperate. It is in any given individual’s short-term self interest not to cooperate: to defect, in game theory terms. But if everyone defects, society falls apart. To ensure widespread cooperation and minimal defection, we collectively implement a variety of societal security systems.

Two of these systems evolved in prehistory: morals and reputation. Two others evolved as our social groups became larger and more formal: laws and technical security systems. What these security systems do, effectively, is give individuals incentives to act in the group interest. But none of these systems, with the possible exception of some fanciful science-fiction technologies, can ever bring that dishonest minority down to zero.

In complex modern societies, many complications intrude on this simple model of societal security. Decisions to cooperate or defect are often made by groups of people — governments, corporations, and so on — and there are important differences because of dynamics inside and outside the groups. Much of our societal security is delegated — to the police, for example — and becomes institutionalized; the dynamics of this are also important. Power struggles over who controls the mechanisms of societal security are inherent: “group interest” rapidly devolves to “the king’s interest.” Societal security can become a tool for those in power to remain in power, with the definition of “honest majority” being simply the people who follows the rules.

The term “dishonest minority” is not a moral judgment; it simply describes the minority who does not follow societal norm. Since many societal norms are in fact immoral, sometimes the dishonest minority serves as a catalyst for social change. Societies without a reservoir of people who don’t follow the rules lack an important mechanism for societal evolution. Vibrant societies need a dishonest minority; if society makes its dishonest minority too small, it stifles dissent as well as common crime. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/05/status_report_t.html

Cf. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/02/societal_securi.html

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The Hired Gun Mechanism “We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader–the department chair, the building superintendent, the team captain. This hired gun, we show, need only punish the least compliant group member, and then only punish this person enough so that the person would have rather been the second least compliant. We show experimentally this mechanism, despite having very small penalties out of equilibrium, reaches the full compliance equilibrium almost instantly.” http://www.nber.org/papers/w17032.pdf

Gun For Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods? “This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the “hired gun” mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. The “hired gun” mechanism (Andreoni and Gee, 2011) is an example of a low cost device that promotes complete compliances and minimal enforcement as the unique Nash equilibrium. We find that subjects are willing to pay to hire a delegated policing mechanism over 70% of the time, and that this mechanism increases welfare between 15% to 40%. Moreover, the lion’s share of the welfare gain comes because the hired gun crowds out vigilante peer-to-peer punishments.” http://www.nber.org/papers/w17033.pdf

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Taxes & Voting: “[...] Thoreau [...] argues that people should be allowed to decide to not pay their taxes if they decide to withdraw from the political system. He does, however, make a point of saying that people should pay for what they use, such as paying the highway tax if one uses the highway. [...]” http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=2695

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[Video] Voting is violence, Riley Yieding

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Bruce Sterling

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Posts:

0. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/pont

1. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

2. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

3. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

4. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-re-re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

5. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-re-re-re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

Original:

https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en

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On 6 December 2010 04:15, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
>> 2. Alan, in a way it have obtained: I raised this issue as a routine
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment
>
> I don’t consider thought experiments to be evidence. They are good
> argument. In this case there are a number of substantive issues that
> we are far from understanding, so I don’t think the thought experiment
> is enough.
>

ok

>> You say that AIs running on the internet would be generically
>> dependent continuants (not MaterialEntities) and all generically
>> dependent continuants have material bases, which are presumably
>> MaterialEntities, specifically, spatially dispersed sets of Objects.
>
> Yes.

ok

>> You say that I’m an independent continuant while I’m flesh and blood,
>> “uploading” would change me (still me) into a dependent continuant
>> with a material basis (presumably a set of Objects), and “downloading”
>> again would presumably change me back into an independent continuant.
>
> I don’t believe I said that.
> Rather: I don’t really know what constitutes the identity of a person.
> If it came to be known that this identity could be preserved when
> uploading, then we would know that it was a kind of generically
> dependent continuant. When in your body, the body would be the
> material entity that bears the concretization of that GDC.
> BFO doesn’t have such an entity (your sense of person/AI) so nothing
> would need to be changed in BFO should we learn this is possible.
> However if other ontologies had made a commitment that contradicted
> this they would need to be changed.

makes sense and consistent in itself: you say that BFO is independent (and you are agnostic, at least as long as possible) on a lot of issues. The concept of agency/personship is one of them.

>> But do I have the right to fork
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fork_(software_development) BFO at all?
>
> You do, but it would be considered bad practice to change any of the
> intended meanings of BFO terms, or to distribute it in any way that it
> might be confused by someone to be the real BFO.
>
> Better to create another ontology and import and use BFO terms where
> appropriate.
>
>> I feel so that the default copyright for ontologies is
>> http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ but I’d appreciate if you
>> would publish the copyright (e.g.
>> http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ ) of BFO.
>
> It is so said in the OWL file
> http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0

Copyright: thank you, I didn’t notice it.
Disambiguation: I understand your concern. I’ll do it bona fide.

>> On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
>>>>[I think it would not be useful to regard
>>>> her [the AI] as something that has a material basis.
>>>
>>> It isn’t a matter of useful. It’s a matter of true.
>>
>> I’m sorry I was negligent.
>>
>> 1. Clarification: I think it would not be useful to regard an eventual
>> AI or the uploaded me as a dependent continuant with an independent
>> continuant material basis which is a scattered set of material
>> Objects. I think it would be useful to regard an AI and myself to be
>> independent continuants, invariant to eventual changes in our material
>> bases.
>
> That’s fine. Buy you are not using the terms as BFO intends them.
> Better to define new additional terms that define things the way think
> they should be. FWIW, I think it is possible that you don’t understand
> what it means to be a material basis in BFO.

ad1. see below

>> 2. Truth: I think what I say (modified by the Clarification above) is
>> (ontologically) true = invariant to (ontological) transformations (cf.
>> the end of my previous letter).
>
> Yes, but the truth I was referring to was deeper. There isn’t
> anything, according to BFO, that doesn’t depend on something material.

ad2. see below

>> 3. Usefulness: I think usefulness (and elegance etc.) is not
>> superfluous in ontological research either. Pragmatic approach to
>> ontology presupposes usefulness (and at least non-falseness). I think
>> there are useful ontologies just like there are useful theorems:
>> “[...]
>> – useful theorem: theorem that leads to many new ones [...]”
>
> It depends on what your definition of ontology is. BFO is trying to be
> an ontology in the sense of being a catalog of types of things that
> exist. It is proposed that building ontologies in this sense is
> already damned useful for it’s targeted purposes.

I think I understand what material basis means in BFO (but that thought of mine may be a part of the problem:) Let’s check it and see.

You say that “exists = (matter itself and/or) have material basis”.
‘Exists = (matter itself and/or) have material basis’ := ‘X=Mb’

Case I.

If you think X=Mb is an axiom of BFO 1.1, it’s ok. Then you can say that

• either you can slide “information” into the pigeon holes of the BFO 1.1 (e.g. an AI on the internet or the uploaded me or an imaginary magenta unicorn pegasus are generally dependent continuants with material basis),
• or “information” (which does not have material basis) is nonexistent (it would contradict to the axiom).

This is the scenario

• where you say that “BFO is trying to be an ontology in the sense of being a catalog of types of things that exist”, and you reject that meaning of “information” which may or may not have material basis (obviously along with other similar “things”, e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luminiferous_aether ) presumably as “speculative metaphysics” (à la Kant, Heidegger), and
• where every continuant with a speculative mind (like me:), be it independent or dependent, using the fact that in BFO 1.1 owl:Thing =/= bfo:Entity, have the legitimate opportunity to reveal other categories under owl:Thing but outside the category bfo:Entity, e.g. a category Nonentity, or a category dolce-lite:Quale.
• This approach is too “postmodern” to be an ontology in one (the “continental”) meaning (“[Philosophy] the branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being” [= owl:Thing, including a rigorous and exhaustive organization of it that is hierarchical and contains all the relevant entities and their relations]),
• but it’s ok in the (“analytic”) other (“[Logic] the set of entities presupposed by a theory” / “[computer science] a rigorous and exhaustive organization of some knowledge domain that is usually hierarchical and contains all the relevant entities and their relations”) http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ontology

Case II.

But if

• you think that X=Mb is a deep (basic) truth (of ontology in philosophical meaning) mapped into an axiom of BFO, i.e. BFO is a basic ontology in the philosophical meaning above, and
• tertium non datur,

then I think X=Mb is simply false.

(I don’t know whether BFO has this – type II – ambition at all:

• on one hand, it is so close to it that it would be a sin:) to miss the opportunity,
• on the other, in BFO 1.1, owl:Thing =/= bfo:Entity as if BFO would not be confident enough to be type II and would ensure place for the diversity of ontologies.)

Why false? Suppose for a while that I completely accept the solution of BFO 1.1 for AI-s running on the internet (i.e, they are generically dependent continuants, not MaterialEntities, and all generically dependent continuants have material bases, which are MaterialEntities, specifically, spatially dispersed sets of Objects).
However, this would not solve

• my original problem (that universe in itself could possibly essentially be made of information with matter as special case of it, cf. http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html http://blog.wolfram.com/2007/09/11/my-hobby-hunting-for-our-universe/ ) and
• similar problems (e.g., do you think that the not-yet-observed not-even-verified superstrings are axiomatically non-existent as if they were not real? or rather they have material bases cf. https://www.newgrounds.com/portal/view/525347 ?? or matter is defined by Mb:=X???),

and so would not mean that X=Mb.

If you say that matter is the nesessary building block for owl:Thing, you make the mistake in logic I made at first (“I may like information to be the “infrastucture” of matter but you are right: for an ontology this would be a superfluous presumption and a logical fallacy of this kind: http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/mary/Default.aspx “).

So in Case II we do the right thing if we abandon our demand for the preeminence of information and of matter and in general of any specific owl:Thing.

What the universe (more exactly: owl:Thing) is made of at the “fundamental level” is an open empirical (rather than a speculative / a thought experiment kind of) question yet (cf. e.g. http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2010/12/lhc-spots-no-black-holes-eliminates-some-versions-of-string-theory.ars ): I don’t think so that BFO in Case II should decide on it in advance. BFO in Case II should be explicitely independent on all “speculative mathaphysical” answers.

Solution

In Case I: There is no problem to solve.

Your axioms/categories are yours, mine are mine: there is no further need to argue (you don’t argue fiercely e.g. on Dewey numbers:) and no need to change anything on BFO 1.1. The only (absolutely legitimate!) task left is to keep BFO away form revolution and let it evolve into other disciplines.

In Case II: Back to the future!

Fortunately, even if I am right in what I am saying above, BFO itself(!) has a solution for the problem of Case II: your internal solution in Case II is BFO 1.0 ( http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/1.0 ) The structure of the previous version of BFO is “agnostic”: independent on what owl:Thing is supposed to made of.

Of course, BFO 1.1 is an improvement on 1.0: Disposotion, Function and Role are bundled into a category in 1.0, and bundling Object, FiatObjectPart and ObjectAggregate into a new category in 1.1 is a parallel idea. BFO may retain the new structure in the next version of BFO as well.

The problem is, as the forensic investigations show:), that this stuctural change was accompanied by the silent introduction of X=Mb by calling the new category ‘MaterialEntity’. This is why BFO 1.1 is not just a harmless improvement of 1.0. From the point of view of Case II, 1.1 is 1.0 constrained by the false X=Mb.

I think (the Platonic idea of) BFO is deeper than 1.1, and 1.0 is closer to it.

Suggestions

I’m a just a user of BFO, not even a heavy one, one among many thousands. You should put my suggestions in their right place.

For me it is very important to clarify: how would look like the BFO I would be happy to work with, without the need to fork it?

1. It would be modular: a core and auxiliary axioms (or alternative auxiliary axiom systems). BFO is independent on a lot of issues. The concept of agency/personship is one of them. For me, agency/personship is ontologically important, but you are right: this doesn’t imply that the core of BFO should contain personship. However, it implies that BFO should not preclude the ontological concept of personship.
BFO should be modular: its core

• should remain indenpendent on theories in ontology (like the ontological construction of the concept of agency and personship) and
• should become independent on open empirical questions (like the fundamental constitution of owl:Things).

2. It would have a Type II core.
The core of BFO seems to me the right place for the philosophical/continental meaning of ontology (Case II above). This is why
2.1. I would consider removing the the root category bfo:Entity from BFO. In philosophical meaning of ontology bfo:Entity is not different to owl:Thing, it would be an inappropriate postmodern modesty:) not to erease it.
2.2. I would change the label of the BFO 1.1 category ‘MaterialEntity’ into another label without reference to matter and to any other specific hypothetical constitution of owl:Thing.
(2.3. I would revisit the examples and the wording of the definitions of BFO 1.1 based on the arguments above.)

3. It would have different Type I auxiliary axioms.
3.A. With the BFO core + X=Mb as an auxiliary axiom, we could essentially reconstruct BFO 1.1.
3.B. With the BFO core + an auxiliary axiom alternative to X=Mb, I would be able to describe what I think to be ontologically important.

Results

In this https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15 conversation BFO 1.0 has revealed itself as more profound than BFO 1.1. Minor changes in BFO 1.0 could result in a future BFO core independent on material or any other specific hypothetical constitution of owl:Thing. BFO core + auxiliary axiom X=Mb would reconstruct BFO 1.1. BFO core + alternative auxiliary axioms would ensure conceptual space for alternative ontologies without the need to change or fork the BFO core, and without any interference with the reconstructed BFO 1.1.

[Original: https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en ]

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The War on Cameras – It has never been easier—or more dangerous—to record the police: “Michael Allison, a 41-year-old backyard mechanic from southeastern Illinois, faces up to 75 years in prison for an act most people don’t realize is a crime: recording public officials.” http://reason.com/archives/2010/12/07/the-war-on-cameras/print

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Dear list-members, Alan, Barry and Janna,

based on the conversation I have set Entity back as a root category in
POnt https://github.com/mazsa/Personal-Ontology/raw/master/pont.owl :
thank you for your help.

On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
> 2010/11/29 Mázsa Péter :
>> Suppose a (likewise hypothetical) Artificial Intelligence [AI]
>> running on the internet is a person. Do you think that she has a
>> material basis / is an independently continuant material object
>> (bearing a role of person)?
>
> The BFO approach would be to deal with that eventuality when and if it obtains.

On 29 November 2010 20:01, Barry Smith wrote:
>> 1. You are a person. Are you sure you think that a material basis is
>> absolutely necessary for you? If you had the opportunity do you think
>> you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [...]
>
> when this is shown to be possible, we will re-address the issue;

1. Thank you, this is a pragmatic answer, I can live with it.

2. Alan, in a way it have obtained: I raised this issue as a routine
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment

On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
> 2010/11/29 Mázsa Péter :
>>>> What is absolutely necessary for POnt is that there should be a place
>>>> for Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material Entities
>>>> (or Boundaries or Sites).
>>>
>>> Why do you need them to be independent? In what way would dependent
>>> continuant not be correct? Are there some things that do not have a
>>> material basis?
>>
>> I think you think this AI is an independent continuant, but I can’t imagine how you think she is
>> a material object.
>
> I didn’t say the AI was a material entity. I said it was a generically
> dependent continuant.
>
>> If you had the opportunity do you think
>> you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [...]
>
> If possible, I would. Whether possible is an open question.
> After I uploaded I would have a different material basis (some digital
> form of memory)
> In BFO we call such entities generically dependent continuants.

You say that AIs running on the internet would be generically
dependent continuants (not MaterialEntities) and all generically
dependent continuants have material bases, which are presumably
MaterialEntities, specifically, spatially dispersed sets of Objects.

You say that I’m an independent continuant while I’m flesh and blood,
“uploading” would change me (still me) into a dependent continuant
with a material basis (presumably a set of Objects), and “downloading”
again would presumably change me back into an independent continuant.

Similarly, if dependent continuant AIs running on the internet would
“download” themselves exclusively into robots partitioned in space,
they would presumably become independent continuants.

OK, I understand. Whether possible is an open question, but eventually
and occasionally I / AI might switch my / her ontological status in
BFO, without ceasing to be myself / herself, so this me / her is
jumping across ontological categories.

>> I think filing them into the existing categories of
>> BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
>> ugly.]
>
> Sorry to have offended.
))
perhaps I was not PC: celestial spheres are perfect companies for us
to work with them, e.g. to predict planetary movements and
configurations; they are just … under-attractive:) to my taste

On 29 November 2010 20:01, Barry Smith wrote:
>> I think filing them into the existing categories of
>> BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
>> ugly.]
>>
> there are so many problems facing use of BFO in support of established
> science, we cannot waste time on merely hypothetical issues; for this you
> may wish to use DOLCE
>
>> I think that what we think of as persons are “things” that do not
>> necessarily and intuitively have a material basis. Are you convinced
>> by the thought experiments above?
>>
> This is not the issue; the issue is how to ensure BFO is successful in
> performing the jobs it needs to perform today
> BS

OK, this is the (acceptable) pragmatic line. Of course I cannot insist
on the modification of the preferences of the BFO-community based on
my unproven thoughts.

But do I have the right to fork
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fork_(software_development) BFO at all? I
feel so that the default copyright for ontologies is
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ but I’d appreciate if you
would publish the copyright (e.g.
http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ ) of BFO.

On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
>>[I think it would not be useful to regard
>> her [the AI] as something that has a material basis.
>
> It isn’t a matter of useful. It’s a matter of true.

I’m sorry I was negligent.

1. Clarification: I think it would not be useful to regard an eventual
AI or the uploaded me as a dependent continuant with an independent
continuant material basis which is a scattered set of material
Objects. I think it would be useful to regard an AI and myself to be
independent continuants, invariant to eventual changes in our material
bases.

2. Truth: I think what I say (modified by the Clarification above) is
(ontologically) true = invariant to (ontological) transformations (cf.
the end of my previous letter).

3. Usefulness: I think usefulness (and elegance etc.) is not
superfluous in ontological research either. Pragmatic approach to
ontology presupposes usefulness (and at least non-falseness). I think
there are useful ontologies just like there are useful theorems:
“[...] – elegant theorem: theorem whose statement is short and somewhat unique

• interesting theorem [...]: theorem that cannot readily be deduced

from earlier ones, but is well connected

• boring theorem: theorem for which there are many others very much like it
• useful theorem: theorem that leads to many new ones
• powerful theorem: theorem that substantially reduces the lengths of

proofs needed for many others

• surprising theorem: theorem that appears in an otherwise sparse part

of the network

• deep theorem: theorem that connects components of the network that

otherwise far away

• important theorem: theorem that allows a broad new area of the

network to be reached”

https://www.wolframscience.com/nksonline/page-1176

P.

On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
> 2010/11/29 Mázsa Péter :
>> On 24 November 2010 17:42, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
>>> 2010/11/24 Mázsa Péter :
>>>> What is absolutely necessary for POnt is that there should be a place
>>>> for Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material Entities
>>>> (or Boundaries or Sites).
>>>
>>> Why do you need them to be independent? In what way would dependent
>>> continuant not be correct? Are there some things that do not have a
>>> material basis?
>>
>> 1. You are a person. Are you sure you think that a material basis is
>> absolutely necessary for you?
>
> Yes.
>
>> If you had the opportunity do you think
>> you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [I think
>> I would. And I would use e.g. Git
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git_(software) for version control, i.e.
>> branching and merging of my bodiless minds & minds "downloaded" into
>> other bodies criss-crossing the Earth & the Universe and being happy
>> not to be dead:]
>
> If possible, I would. Whether possible is an open question.
> After I uploaded I would have a different material basis (some digital
> form of memory)
> In BFO we call such entities generically dependent continuants.
>
>> 2. Suppose a (likewise hypothetical) Artificial Intelligence [AI]
>> running on the internet is a person. Do you think that she has a
>> material basis / is an independently continuant material object
>> (bearing a role of person)?
>
> The BFO approach would be to deal with that eventuality when and if it obtains.
> In any case, I think, in your formulation, yes, it would have at least
> one material basis
>
>>[I think it would not be useful to regard
>> her as something that has a material basis.
>
> It isn't a matter of useful. It's a matter of true.
>
>> I think you think this AI is an independent continuant, but I can't imagine how you think she is
>> a material object.
>
> I didn't say the AI was a material entity. I said it was a generically
> dependent continuant.
>
>> I think filing them into the existing categories of
>> BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
>> ugly.]
>
> Sorry to have offended.
>
>> I think that what we think of as persons are “things” that do not
>> necessarily and intuitively have a material basis. Are you convinced
>> by the thought experiments above?
>
> No.
>
> -Alan

On 29 November 2010 20:01, Barry Smith wrote:
>
>
> 2010/11/29 Mázsa Péter >>
>> On 24 November 2010 17:42, Alan Ruttenberg
>> wrote:
>> > 2010/11/24 Mázsa Péter :
>> >> What is absolutely necessary for POnt is that there should be a place
>> >> for Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material Entities
>> >> (or Boundaries or Sites).
>> >
>> > Why do you need them to be independent? In what way would dependent
>> > continuant not be correct? Are there some things that do not have a
>> > material basis?
>>
>> 1. You are a person. Are you sure you think that a material basis is
>> absolutely necessary for you? If you had the opportunity do you think
>> you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [I think
>> I would. And I would use e.g. Git
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git_(software) for version control, i.e.
>> branching and merging of my bodiless minds & minds "downloaded" into
>> other bodies criss-crossing the Earth & the Universe and being happy
>> not to be dead:]
>
> when this is shown to be possible, we will re-address the issue;  
>>
>> 2. Suppose a (likewise hypothetical) Artificial Intelligence [AI]
>> running on the internet is a person. Do you think that she has a
>> material basis / is an independently continuant material object
>> (bearing a role of person)? [I think it would not be useful to regard
>> her as something that has a material basis. I think you think this AI
>> is an independent continuant, but I can't imagine how you think she is
>> a material object. I think filing them into the existing categories of
>> BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
>> ugly.]
>>
> there are so many problems facing use of BFO in support of established
> science, we cannot waste time on merely hypothetical issues; for this you
> may wish to use DOLCE
>  
>>
>> I think that what we think of as persons are “things” that do not
>> necessarily and intuitively have a material basis. Are you convinced
>> by the thought experiments above?
>>
> This is not the issue; the issue is how to ensure BFO is successful in
> performing the jobs it needs to perform today
> BS

[Original: https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en ]

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On 24 November 2010 17:42, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
> 2010/11/24 Mázsa Péter:
>> What is absolutely necessary for POnt is that there should be a place
>> for Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material Entities
>> (or Boundaries or Sites).
>
> Why do you need them to be independent? In what way would dependent
> continuant not be correct? Are there some things that do not have a
> material basis?

1. You are a person. Are you sure you think that a material basis is
absolutely necessary for you? If you had the opportunity do you think
you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [I think
I would. And I would use e.g. Git
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git_(software) for version control, i.e.
branching and merging of my bodiless minds & minds "downloaded" into
other bodies criss-crossing the Earth & the Universe and being happy
not to be dead:]

2. Suppose a (likewise hypothetical) Artificial Intelligence [AI]
running on the internet is a person. Do you think that she has a
material basis / is an independently continuant material object
(bearing a role of person)? [I think it would not be useful to regard
her as something that has a material basis. I think you think this AI
is an independent continuant, but I can't imagine how you think she is
a material object. I think filing them into the existing categories of
BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
ugly.]

I think that what we think of as persons are “things” that do not
necessarily and intuitively have a material basis. Are you convinced
by the thought experiments above?

On 24 November 2010 18:48, Barry Smith wrote:
> did you look at IAO, which extends Buffalo, and places information artifacts
> under BFO:generically dependent continuants:
> http://code.google.com/p/information-artifact-ontology/

The uploaded and version controlled (information artifact) me might be
somehow depend on the decesed me – perhaps otherwise than “Borges” on
“me” in http://www.amherstlecture.org/perry2007/Borges%20and%20I.pdf ,
but both of us may live with the consciousness that you filed (the
uploaded) me into the category BFO:generically dependent continuants.

But what would be the independent continuant material basis of the AI
on the internet? A set of electrons / photons?

On 24 November 2010 17:42, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
> For example, we would consider “Legal person” as a role, and could
> then define a class of material entities that bear this role. Such a
> class does not have to be a subclass of homo sapiens.

Persons are continuants without doubt.

As I understand you think that

• you as a homo sapiens are an instance of independently continuant

material object, and

• a legal person is a class of independently continuant material

objects [or a class of other legal persons and independently
continuant material objects, etc.] bearing a (dependently continuant)
role of “legal person”.

The question whether personship is a role has a very long history, my
favorite contemporary texts on this history are

http://www.amazon.com/Category-Person-Anthropology-Philosophy-History/dp/0521277574

and

http://www.amazon.com/Pluralism-Personality-State-Ideas-Context/dp/0521022630

(cf. of course http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html
esp ch. 16. and 2nd part where personship is a role and

http://www.amazon.com/Reasons-Persons-Oxford-Paperbacks-Parfit/dp/019824908X

on the logical construction of personship).

If you think that you are an independently continuant material object
bearing a role of “natural person”, then you think personship is a
role. (Or you think that natural persons are unique among persons in
being independently continuant material objects without bearing a
role?)

I think personship is not a role: roles are a kind of connection
between persons. As I wrote above I think that persons are not
independently continuant material objects bearing (dependently
continuant) roles but independent continuants who do not necessarily
and intuitively have a material basis (“Independent Continuants who
are not necessarily Material Entities (or Boundaries or Sites)”). E.g.
I think I am an independent continuant who is necessarily material as
a body (of a homo sapiens) and as an individual person but not as a
person.

The question remains whether the Person-Object divide has ontological
(vs. “mere” ethical) significance (like the Continuant-Occurent
divide). If you accept (as I do) or suppose for a moment that “An
objective fact is one that is invariant under all admissible
transformations” (Nozick: Invariances

http://www.amazon.com/Invariances-Structure-Objective-Robert-Nozick/dp/0674012453

p. 82., in general in part “2. Invariance and Objectivity” pp.
75-119., and in particular to ethics in chapter “Ethical Truth and
Ethical Objectivity”, pp. 284-294.) you can see

• why I insist on invariance in my ethics,
• why I think that implementing the invariance-requirement is the way

how we can avoid a contingent definition of person.
My criticism of BFO “embodied” in POnt stems from the fact that I think that

• the (hypothetical) transformation of the origin of a person (natural

vs authored, e.g. material vs uploaded, or individual vs AI) is an
ontological transformation, and

• personship is invariant to this transformation as well.

This is why I think that POnt is a pure ontology, i.e., not
“contaminated” with ethics, and perhaps with relevance to BFO.

Peter

[Original: https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en ]

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