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  • mazsa 22:02 on January 23, 2012 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , State   

    A gram of circumvention is worth a metric ton of lobbying.

    Charles Johnson
     

  • mazsa 15:29 on November 19, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , State, ,   

    “tribal communities are the default system of human social nature. Humanity evolved that way for millennia after exiting the hunter-gatherer band stage of social life. Many of the planet’s diverse societies have since moved on toward becoming modern states, but not all of them have. And even for those that have, the shadowy emotional residues of the distant past remain; we never lose anything in evolution, but instead add new developments to older ones. That is Fox’s central idea and the theme running through The Tribal Imagination.

    It is also a truth, Fox believes, that we ignore at our peril as we go stumbling about in far-away strange places where tribes rule with an authority denied the more-or-less absent state. The pride and latent violence of groups of mutually suspicious kindred must be the starting point, Fox says, for anyone venturing into this political landscape. Such men and women are not the free individual citizens of a recognized territorial jurisdiction; nor are they people with clearly defined and defensible legal rights with respect to the state, whether in Libya or Iraq or Afghanistan.

    This truth, he says, sheds a harsh light on instances when “our leaders make claims about human nature and the natural state of human society as justifications for political action, armed intervention included.” These leaders, more often than not, suggests Fox, simply refuse to understand the essentially tribal nature of the lands they hope to remake. They are reluctant to grasp that

    there is no ‘Iraqi People’. The phrase should be banned as misleading and purely rhetorical. . . . What is not understood is that Iraq, like the other countries of the region, still stands at a level of social evolution where the family, clan, tribe and sect command major allegiance. The idea of the individual autonomous voter, necessary and commonplace in our own systems, is relatively foreign.

    Numerous unforeseen events during the Iraq occupation have illustrated the priority of tribal authority. When men came out and stole copper wire connecting hospitals to the electricity grid, indignant U.S. soldiers tried to make the thieves see that their actions would hurt “the Iraqi people.” True to form, the thieves responded just as Aouda had a hundred years before: Who were these “Iraqi people”, they wanted to know, whose claims outranked those of their own needy relatives? The thieving clansmen felt no responsibility for some mythical collectivity called “the people” that, as far as they knew, did not include them and that, in any case, foreigners had invented without their approval. In contrast, they were absolutely bound by customary law to help their kin” http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=990

     

  • mazsa 11:41 on June 29, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , State   

    Government internet control increases online radicalisation – LulzSec is not an isolated phenomenon http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/28/radical-hackers-lulzsec-governments

     

  • mazsa 23:02 on June 27, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , State,   

    Policing the Police: Apps That Let You Spy on the Cops http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/06/policing-the-police-the-apps-that-let-you-spy-on-the-cops/240916/

     

  • mazsa 14:46 on May 17, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , State   

    How to exit the euro – a proposal from 1997 http://moslereconomics.com/2011/05/16/how-to-exit-the-euro-a-proposal-from-1997/

     

  • mazsa 13:33 on May 9, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , State   

    All complex systems contain parasites. In any system of cooperative behavior, an uncooperative strategy will be effective — and the system will tolerate the uncooperatives — as long as they’re not too numerous or too effective. Thus, as a species evolves cooperative behavior, it also evolves a dishonest minority that takes advantage of the honest majority. If individuals within a species have the ability to switch strategies, the dishonest minority will never be reduced to zero. As a result, the species simultaneously evolves two things: 1) security systems to protect itself from this dishonest minority, and 2) deception systems to successfully be parasitic.

    Humans evolved along this path. The basic mechanism can be modeled simply. It is in our collective group interest for everyone to cooperate. It is in any given individual’s short-term self interest not to cooperate: to defect, in game theory terms. But if everyone defects, society falls apart. To ensure widespread cooperation and minimal defection, we collectively implement a variety of societal security systems.

    Two of these systems evolved in prehistory: morals and reputation. Two others evolved as our social groups became larger and more formal: laws and technical security systems. What these security systems do, effectively, is give individuals incentives to act in the group interest. But none of these systems, with the possible exception of some fanciful science-fiction technologies, can ever bring that dishonest minority down to zero.

    In complex modern societies, many complications intrude on this simple model of societal security. Decisions to cooperate or defect are often made by groups of people — governments, corporations, and so on — and there are important differences because of dynamics inside and outside the groups. Much of our societal security is delegated — to the police, for example — and becomes institutionalized; the dynamics of this are also important. Power struggles over who controls the mechanisms of societal security are inherent: “group interest” rapidly devolves to “the king’s interest.” Societal security can become a tool for those in power to remain in power, with the definition of “honest majority” being simply the people who follows the rules.

    The term “dishonest minority” is not a moral judgment; it simply describes the minority who does not follow societal norm. Since many societal norms are in fact immoral, sometimes the dishonest minority serves as a catalyst for social change. Societies without a reservoir of people who don’t follow the rules lack an important mechanism for societal evolution. Vibrant societies need a dishonest minority; if society makes its dishonest minority too small, it stifles dissent as well as common crime. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/05/status_report_t.html

    Cf. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/02/societal_securi.html

     

  • mazsa 08:01 on May 9, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , State   

    The Hired Gun Mechanism “We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader–the department chair, the building superintendent, the team captain. This hired gun, we show, need only punish the least compliant group member, and then only punish this person enough so that the person would have rather been the second least compliant. We show experimentally this mechanism, despite having very small penalties out of equilibrium, reaches the full compliance equilibrium almost instantly.” http://www.nber.org/papers/w17032.pdf

    Gun For Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods? “This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the “hired gun” mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. The “hired gun” mechanism (Andreoni and Gee, 2011) is an example of a low cost device that promotes complete compliances and minimal enforcement as the unique Nash equilibrium. We find that subjects are willing to pay to hire a delegated policing mechanism over 70% of the time, and that this mechanism increases welfare between 15% to 40%. Moreover, the lion’s share of the welfare gain comes because the hired gun crowds out vigilante peer-to-peer punishments.” http://www.nber.org/papers/w17033.pdf

     

  • mazsa 12:11 on March 27, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , State, ,   

    Taxes & Voting: “[...] Thoreau [...] argues that people should be allowed to decide to not pay their taxes if they decide to withdraw from the political system. He does, however, make a point of saying that people should pay for what they use, such as paying the highway tax if one uses the highway. [...]” http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=2695

     

  • mazsa 08:46 on March 4, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , State,   

    [Video] Voting is violence, Riley Yieding

     

  • mazsa 14:07 on December 23, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , State, ,   

    That’s the real issue, that’s the big modern problem; national governments and global computer networks don’t mix any more. It’s like trying to eat a very private birthday cake while also distributing it. That scheme is just not working. And that failure has a face now, and that’s Julian Assange. [...] Everybody wants everybody else’s national government to leak. Every state wants to see the diplomatic cables of every other state. It will bend heaven and earth to get them. It’s just, that sacred activity is not supposed to be privatized, or, worse yet, made into the no-profit, shareable, have-at-it fodder for a network society, as if global diplomacy were so many mp3s. Now the US State Department has walked down the thorny road to hell that was first paved by the music industry. Rock and roll, baby.

    Bruce Sterling
     

  • mazsa 08:06 on December 20, 2010 Permalink | Reply
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    Posts on Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha on BFO-list 

    Posts:

    0. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/pont

    1. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    2. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    3. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    4. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-re-re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    5. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-re-re-re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    Original:

    https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en

     

  • mazsa 08:04 on December 20, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , , State   

    Re: Re: Re: Re: Dear BFO Community, let me introduce you POnt – Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha 

    [Cf. the whole sequence: http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/posts-on-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha-on-bfo-list ]

    On 6 December 2010 04:15, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
    >> 2. Alan, in a way it have obtained: I raised this issue as a routine
    >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment :)
    >
    > I don’t consider thought experiments to be evidence. They are good
    > argument. In this case there are a number of substantive issues that
    > we are far from understanding, so I don’t think the thought experiment
    > is enough.
    > ;-)

    ok

    >> You say that AIs running on the internet would be generically
    >> dependent continuants (not MaterialEntities) and all generically
    >> dependent continuants have material bases, which are presumably
    >> MaterialEntities, specifically, spatially dispersed sets of Objects.
    >
    > Yes.

    ok

    >> You say that I’m an independent continuant while I’m flesh and blood,
    >> “uploading” would change me (still me) into a dependent continuant
    >> with a material basis (presumably a set of Objects), and “downloading”
    >> again would presumably change me back into an independent continuant.
    >
    > I don’t believe I said that.
    > Rather: I don’t really know what constitutes the identity of a person.
    > If it came to be known that this identity could be preserved when
    > uploading, then we would know that it was a kind of generically
    > dependent continuant. When in your body, the body would be the
    > material entity that bears the concretization of that GDC.
    > BFO doesn’t have such an entity (your sense of person/AI) so nothing
    > would need to be changed in BFO should we learn this is possible.
    > However if other ontologies had made a commitment that contradicted
    > this they would need to be changed.

    makes sense and consistent in itself: you say that BFO is independent (and you are agnostic, at least as long as possible) on a lot of issues. The concept of agency/personship is one of them.

    >> But do I have the right to fork
    >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fork_(software_development) BFO at all?
    >
    > You do, but it would be considered bad practice to change any of the
    > intended meanings of BFO terms, or to distribute it in any way that it
    > might be confused by someone to be the real BFO.
    >
    > Better to create another ontology and import and use BFO terms where
    > appropriate.
    >
    >> I feel so that the default copyright for ontologies is
    >> http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ but I’d appreciate if you
    >> would publish the copyright (e.g.
    >> http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ ) of BFO.
    >
    > It is so said in the OWL file
    > http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0

    Copyright: thank you, I didn’t notice it.
    Disambiguation: I understand your concern. I’ll do it bona fide.

    >> On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
    >>>>[I think it would not be useful to regard
    >>>> her [the AI] as something that has a material basis.
    >>>
    >>> It isn’t a matter of useful. It’s a matter of true.
    >>
    >> I’m sorry I was negligent.
    >>
    >> 1. Clarification: I think it would not be useful to regard an eventual
    >> AI or the uploaded me as a dependent continuant with an independent
    >> continuant material basis which is a scattered set of material
    >> Objects. I think it would be useful to regard an AI and myself to be
    >> independent continuants, invariant to eventual changes in our material
    >> bases.
    >
    > That’s fine. Buy you are not using the terms as BFO intends them.
    > Better to define new additional terms that define things the way think
    > they should be. FWIW, I think it is possible that you don’t understand
    > what it means to be a material basis in BFO.

    ad1. see below

    >> 2. Truth: I think what I say (modified by the Clarification above) is
    >> (ontologically) true = invariant to (ontological) transformations (cf.
    >> the end of my previous letter).
    >
    > Yes, but the truth I was referring to was deeper. There isn’t
    > anything, according to BFO, that doesn’t depend on something material.

    ad2. see below

    >> 3. Usefulness: I think usefulness (and elegance etc.) is not
    >> superfluous in ontological research either. Pragmatic approach to
    >> ontology presupposes usefulness (and at least non-falseness). I think
    >> there are useful ontologies just like there are useful theorems:
    >> “[...]
    >> – useful theorem: theorem that leads to many new ones [...]”
    >
    > It depends on what your definition of ontology is. BFO is trying to be
    > an ontology in the sense of being a catalog of types of things that
    > exist. It is proposed that building ontologies in this sense is
    > already damned useful for it’s targeted purposes.

    I think I understand what material basis means in BFO (but that thought of mine may be a part of the problem:) Let’s check it and see.

    You say that “exists = (matter itself and/or) have material basis”.
    ‘Exists = (matter itself and/or) have material basis’ := ‘X=Mb’

    Case I.

    If you think X=Mb is an axiom of BFO 1.1, it’s ok. Then you can say that

    • either you can slide “information” into the pigeon holes of the BFO 1.1 (e.g. an AI on the internet or the uploaded me or an imaginary magenta unicorn pegasus are generally dependent continuants with material basis),
    • or “information” (which does not have material basis) is nonexistent (it would contradict to the axiom).

    This is the scenario

    • where you say that “BFO is trying to be an ontology in the sense of being a catalog of types of things that exist”, and you reject that meaning of “information” which may or may not have material basis (obviously along with other similar “things”, e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luminiferous_aether ) presumably as “speculative metaphysics” (à la Kant, Heidegger), and
    • where every continuant with a speculative mind (like me:), be it independent or dependent, using the fact that in BFO 1.1 owl:Thing =/= bfo:Entity, have the legitimate opportunity to reveal other categories under owl:Thing but outside the category bfo:Entity, e.g. a category Nonentity, or a category dolce-lite:Quale.
    • This approach is too “postmodern” to be an ontology in one (the “continental”) meaning (“[Philosophy] the branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being” [= owl:Thing, including a rigorous and exhaustive organization of it that is hierarchical and contains all the relevant entities and their relations]),
    • but it’s ok in the (“analytic”) other (“[Logic] the set of entities presupposed by a theory” / “[computer science] a rigorous and exhaustive organization of some knowledge domain that is usually hierarchical and contains all the relevant entities and their relations”) http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ontology

    Case II.

    But if

    • you think that X=Mb is a deep (basic) truth (of ontology in philosophical meaning) mapped into an axiom of BFO, i.e. BFO is a basic ontology in the philosophical meaning above, and
    • tertium non datur,

    then I think X=Mb is simply false.

    (I don’t know whether BFO has this – type II – ambition at all:

    • on one hand, it is so close to it that it would be a sin:) to miss the opportunity,
    • on the other, in BFO 1.1, owl:Thing =/= bfo:Entity as if BFO would not be confident enough to be type II and would ensure place for the diversity of ontologies.)

    Why false? Suppose for a while that I completely accept the solution of BFO 1.1 for AI-s running on the internet (i.e, they are generically dependent continuants, not MaterialEntities, and all generically dependent continuants have material bases, which are MaterialEntities, specifically, spatially dispersed sets of Objects).
    However, this would not solve

    and so would not mean that X=Mb.

    If you say that matter is the nesessary building block for owl:Thing, you make the mistake in logic I made at first (“I may like information to be the “infrastucture” of matter but you are right: for an ontology this would be a superfluous presumption and a logical fallacy of this kind: http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/mary/Default.aspx “).

    So in Case II we do the right thing if we abandon our demand for the preeminence of information and of matter and in general of any specific owl:Thing.

    What the universe (more exactly: owl:Thing) is made of at the “fundamental level” is an open empirical (rather than a speculative / a thought experiment kind of) question yet (cf. e.g. http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2010/12/lhc-spots-no-black-holes-eliminates-some-versions-of-string-theory.ars ): I don’t think so that BFO in Case II should decide on it in advance. BFO in Case II should be explicitely independent on all “speculative mathaphysical” answers.

    Solution

    In Case I: There is no problem to solve.

    Your axioms/categories are yours, mine are mine: there is no further need to argue (you don’t argue fiercely e.g. on Dewey numbers:) and no need to change anything on BFO 1.1. The only (absolutely legitimate!) task left is to keep BFO away form revolution and let it evolve into other disciplines.

    In Case II: Back to the future!

    Fortunately, even if I am right in what I am saying above, BFO itself(!) has a solution for the problem of Case II: your internal solution in Case II is BFO 1.0 ( http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/1.0 ) The structure of the previous version of BFO is “agnostic”: independent on what owl:Thing is supposed to made of.

    Of course, BFO 1.1 is an improvement on 1.0: Disposotion, Function and Role are bundled into a category in 1.0, and bundling Object, FiatObjectPart and ObjectAggregate into a new category in 1.1 is a parallel idea. BFO may retain the new structure in the next version of BFO as well.

    The problem is, as the forensic investigations show:), that this stuctural change was accompanied by the silent introduction of X=Mb by calling the new category ‘MaterialEntity’. This is why BFO 1.1 is not just a harmless improvement of 1.0. From the point of view of Case II, 1.1 is 1.0 constrained by the false X=Mb.

    I think (the Platonic idea of) BFO is deeper than 1.1, and 1.0 is closer to it.

    Suggestions

    I’m a just a user of BFO, not even a heavy one, one among many thousands. You should put my suggestions in their right place.

    For me it is very important to clarify: how would look like the BFO I would be happy to work with, without the need to fork it?

    1. It would be modular: a core and auxiliary axioms (or alternative auxiliary axiom systems). BFO is independent on a lot of issues. The concept of agency/personship is one of them. For me, agency/personship is ontologically important, but you are right: this doesn’t imply that the core of BFO should contain personship. However, it implies that BFO should not preclude the ontological concept of personship.
    BFO should be modular: its core

    • should remain indenpendent on theories in ontology (like the ontological construction of the concept of agency and personship) and
    • should become independent on open empirical questions (like the fundamental constitution of owl:Things).

    2. It would have a Type II core.
    The core of BFO seems to me the right place for the philosophical/continental meaning of ontology (Case II above). This is why
    2.1. I would consider removing the the root category bfo:Entity from BFO. In philosophical meaning of ontology bfo:Entity is not different to owl:Thing, it would be an inappropriate postmodern modesty:) not to erease it.
    2.2. I would change the label of the BFO 1.1 category ‘MaterialEntity’ into another label without reference to matter and to any other specific hypothetical constitution of owl:Thing.
    (2.3. I would revisit the examples and the wording of the definitions of BFO 1.1 based on the arguments above.)

    3. It would have different Type I auxiliary axioms.
    3.A. With the BFO core + X=Mb as an auxiliary axiom, we could essentially reconstruct BFO 1.1.
    3.B. With the BFO core + an auxiliary axiom alternative to X=Mb, I would be able to describe what I think to be ontologically important.

    Results

    In this https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15 conversation BFO 1.0 has revealed itself as more profound than BFO 1.1. Minor changes in BFO 1.0 could result in a future BFO core independent on material or any other specific hypothetical constitution of owl:Thing. BFO core + auxiliary axiom X=Mb would reconstruct BFO 1.1. BFO core + alternative auxiliary axioms would ensure conceptual space for alternative ontologies without the need to change or fork the BFO core, and without any interference with the reconstructed BFO 1.1.

    [Original: https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en ]

     

  • mazsa 10:12 on December 13, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , State   

    The War on Cameras – It has never been easier—or more dangerous—to record the police: “Michael Allison, a 41-year-old backyard mechanic from southeastern Illinois, faces up to 75 years in prison for an act most people don’t realize is a crime: recording public officials.” http://reason.com/archives/2010/12/07/the-war-on-cameras/print

     

  • mazsa 16:17 on December 5, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , , State   

    Re Re: Re: Dear BFO Community, let me introduce you POnt – Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha 

    [Cf. the whole sequence: http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/posts-on-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha-on-bfo-list ]

    Dear list-members, Alan, Barry and Janna,

    based on the conversation I have set Entity back as a root category in
    POnt https://github.com/mazsa/Personal-Ontology/raw/master/pont.owl :
    thank you for your help.

    On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
    > 2010/11/29 Mázsa Péter :
    >> Suppose a (likewise hypothetical) Artificial Intelligence [AI]
    >> running on the internet is a person. Do you think that she has a
    >> material basis / is an independently continuant material object
    >> (bearing a role of person)?
    >
    > The BFO approach would be to deal with that eventuality when and if it obtains.

    On 29 November 2010 20:01, Barry Smith wrote:
    >> 1. You are a person. Are you sure you think that a material basis is
    >> absolutely necessary for you? If you had the opportunity do you think
    >> you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
    >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [...]
    >
    > when this is shown to be possible, we will re-address the issue;

    1. Thank you, this is a pragmatic answer, I can live with it.

    2. Alan, in a way it have obtained: I raised this issue as a routine
    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment :)

    On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
    > 2010/11/29 Mázsa Péter :
    >>>> What is absolutely necessary for POnt is that there should be a place
    >>>> for Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material Entities
    >>>> (or Boundaries or Sites).
    >>>
    >>> Why do you need them to be independent? In what way would dependent
    >>> continuant not be correct? Are there some things that do not have a
    >>> material basis?
    >>
    >> I think you think this AI is an independent continuant, but I can’t imagine how you think she is
    >> a material object.
    >
    > I didn’t say the AI was a material entity. I said it was a generically
    > dependent continuant.
    >
    >> If you had the opportunity do you think
    >> you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
    >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [...]
    >
    > If possible, I would. Whether possible is an open question.
    > After I uploaded I would have a different material basis (some digital
    > form of memory)
    > In BFO we call such entities generically dependent continuants.

    You say that AIs running on the internet would be generically
    dependent continuants (not MaterialEntities) and all generically
    dependent continuants have material bases, which are presumably
    MaterialEntities, specifically, spatially dispersed sets of Objects.

    You say that I’m an independent continuant while I’m flesh and blood,
    “uploading” would change me (still me) into a dependent continuant
    with a material basis (presumably a set of Objects), and “downloading”
    again would presumably change me back into an independent continuant.

    Similarly, if dependent continuant AIs running on the internet would
    “download” themselves exclusively into robots partitioned in space,
    they would presumably become independent continuants.

    OK, I understand. Whether possible is an open question, but eventually
    and occasionally I / AI might switch my / her ontological status in
    BFO, without ceasing to be myself / herself, so this me / her is
    jumping across ontological categories.

    >> I think filing them into the existing categories of
    >> BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
    >> ugly.]
    >
    > Sorry to have offended.
    :) ))
    perhaps I was not PC: celestial spheres are perfect companies for us
    to work with them, e.g. to predict planetary movements and
    configurations; they are just … under-attractive:) to my taste

    On 29 November 2010 20:01, Barry Smith wrote:
    >> I think filing them into the existing categories of
    >> BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
    >> ugly.]
    >>
    > there are so many problems facing use of BFO in support of established
    > science, we cannot waste time on merely hypothetical issues; for this you
    > may wish to use DOLCE
    >
    >> I think that what we think of as persons are “things” that do not
    >> necessarily and intuitively have a material basis. Are you convinced
    >> by the thought experiments above?
    >>
    > This is not the issue; the issue is how to ensure BFO is successful in
    > performing the jobs it needs to perform today
    > BS

    OK, this is the (acceptable) pragmatic line. Of course I cannot insist
    on the modification of the preferences of the BFO-community based on
    my unproven thoughts.

    But do I have the right to fork
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fork_(software_development) BFO at all? I
    feel so that the default copyright for ontologies is
    http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ but I’d appreciate if you
    would publish the copyright (e.g.
    http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ ) of BFO.

    On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
    >>[I think it would not be useful to regard
    >> her [the AI] as something that has a material basis.
    >
    > It isn’t a matter of useful. It’s a matter of true.

    I’m sorry I was negligent.

    1. Clarification: I think it would not be useful to regard an eventual
    AI or the uploaded me as a dependent continuant with an independent
    continuant material basis which is a scattered set of material
    Objects. I think it would be useful to regard an AI and myself to be
    independent continuants, invariant to eventual changes in our material
    bases.

    2. Truth: I think what I say (modified by the Clarification above) is
    (ontologically) true = invariant to (ontological) transformations (cf.
    the end of my previous letter).

    3. Usefulness: I think usefulness (and elegance etc.) is not
    superfluous in ontological research either. Pragmatic approach to
    ontology presupposes usefulness (and at least non-falseness). I think
    there are useful ontologies just like there are useful theorems:
    “[...] – elegant theorem: theorem whose statement is short and somewhat unique

    • interesting theorem [...]: theorem that cannot readily be deduced

    from earlier ones, but is well connected

    • boring theorem: theorem for which there are many others very much like it
    • useful theorem: theorem that leads to many new ones
    • powerful theorem: theorem that substantially reduces the lengths of

    proofs needed for many others

    • surprising theorem: theorem that appears in an otherwise sparse part

    of the network

    • deep theorem: theorem that connects components of the network that

    otherwise far away

    • important theorem: theorem that allows a broad new area of the

    network to be reached”

    https://www.wolframscience.com/nksonline/page-1176

    P.

    On 29 November 2010 19:56, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
    > 2010/11/29 Mázsa Péter :
    >> On 24 November 2010 17:42, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
    >>> 2010/11/24 Mázsa Péter :
    >>>> What is absolutely necessary for POnt is that there should be a place
    >>>> for Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material Entities
    >>>> (or Boundaries or Sites).
    >>>
    >>> Why do you need them to be independent? In what way would dependent
    >>> continuant not be correct? Are there some things that do not have a
    >>> material basis?
    >>
    >> 1. You are a person. Are you sure you think that a material basis is
    >> absolutely necessary for you?
    >
    > Yes.
    >
    >> If you had the opportunity do you think
    >> you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
    >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [I think
    >> I would. And I would use e.g. Git
    >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git_(software) for version control, i.e.
    >> branching and merging of my bodiless minds & minds "downloaded" into
    >> other bodies criss-crossing the Earth & the Universe and being happy
    >> not to be dead:]
    >
    > If possible, I would. Whether possible is an open question.
    > After I uploaded I would have a different material basis (some digital
    > form of memory)
    > In BFO we call such entities generically dependent continuants.
    >
    >> 2. Suppose a (likewise hypothetical) Artificial Intelligence [AI]
    >> running on the internet is a person. Do you think that she has a
    >> material basis / is an independently continuant material object
    >> (bearing a role of person)?
    >
    > The BFO approach would be to deal with that eventuality when and if it obtains.
    > In any case, I think, in your formulation, yes, it would have at least
    > one material basis
    >
    >>[I think it would not be useful to regard
    >> her as something that has a material basis.
    >
    > It isn't a matter of useful. It's a matter of true.
    >
    >> I think you think this AI is an independent continuant, but I can't imagine how you think she is
    >> a material object.
    >
    > I didn't say the AI was a material entity. I said it was a generically
    > dependent continuant.
    >
    >> I think filing them into the existing categories of
    >> BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
    >> ugly.]
    >
    > Sorry to have offended.
    >
    >> I think that what we think of as persons are “things” that do not
    >> necessarily and intuitively have a material basis. Are you convinced
    >> by the thought experiments above?
    >
    > No.
    >
    > -Alan

    On 29 November 2010 20:01, Barry Smith wrote:
    >
    >
    > 2010/11/29 Mázsa Péter >>
    >> On 24 November 2010 17:42, Alan Ruttenberg
    >> wrote:
    >> > 2010/11/24 Mázsa Péter :
    >> >> What is absolutely necessary for POnt is that there should be a place
    >> >> for Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material Entities
    >> >> (or Boundaries or Sites).
    >> >
    >> > Why do you need them to be independent? In what way would dependent
    >> > continuant not be correct? Are there some things that do not have a
    >> > material basis?
    >>
    >> 1. You are a person. Are you sure you think that a material basis is
    >> absolutely necessary for you? If you had the opportunity do you think
    >> you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
    >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [I think
    >> I would. And I would use e.g. Git
    >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git_(software) for version control, i.e.
    >> branching and merging of my bodiless minds & minds "downloaded" into
    >> other bodies criss-crossing the Earth & the Universe and being happy
    >> not to be dead:]
    >
    > when this is shown to be possible, we will re-address the issue;  
    >>
    >> 2. Suppose a (likewise hypothetical) Artificial Intelligence [AI]
    >> running on the internet is a person. Do you think that she has a
    >> material basis / is an independently continuant material object
    >> (bearing a role of person)? [I think it would not be useful to regard
    >> her as something that has a material basis. I think you think this AI
    >> is an independent continuant, but I can't imagine how you think she is
    >> a material object. I think filing them into the existing categories of
    >> BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
    >> ugly.]
    >>
    > there are so many problems facing use of BFO in support of established
    > science, we cannot waste time on merely hypothetical issues; for this you
    > may wish to use DOLCE
    >  
    >>
    >> I think that what we think of as persons are “things” that do not
    >> necessarily and intuitively have a material basis. Are you convinced
    >> by the thought experiments above?
    >>
    > This is not the issue; the issue is how to ensure BFO is successful in
    > performing the jobs it needs to perform today
    > BS

    [Original: https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en ]

     

  • mazsa 09:05 on November 29, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , , State   

    Re: Re: Dear BFO Community, let me introduce you POnt – Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha 

    [Cf. the whole sequence: http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/posts-on-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha-on-bfo-list ]

    On 24 November 2010 17:42, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
    > 2010/11/24 Mázsa Péter:
    >> What is absolutely necessary for POnt is that there should be a place
    >> for Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material Entities
    >> (or Boundaries or Sites).
    >
    > Why do you need them to be independent? In what way would dependent
    > continuant not be correct? Are there some things that do not have a
    > material basis?

    1. You are a person. Are you sure you think that a material basis is
    absolutely necessary for you? If you had the opportunity do you think
    you would “upload” yourself (= convert yourself into information
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading ) before you die? [I think
    I would. And I would use e.g. Git
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git_(software) for version control, i.e.
    branching and merging of my bodiless minds & minds "downloaded" into
    other bodies criss-crossing the Earth & the Universe and being happy
    not to be dead:]

    2. Suppose a (likewise hypothetical) Artificial Intelligence [AI]
    running on the internet is a person. Do you think that she has a
    material basis / is an independently continuant material object
    (bearing a role of person)? [I think it would not be useful to regard
    her as something that has a material basis. I think you think this AI
    is an independent continuant, but I can't imagine how you think she is
    a material object. I think filing them into the existing categories of
    BFO would be like working with celestial spheres: still usable but
    ugly.]

    I think that what we think of as persons are “things” that do not
    necessarily and intuitively have a material basis. Are you convinced
    by the thought experiments above?

    On 24 November 2010 18:48, Barry Smith wrote:
    > did you look at IAO, which extends Buffalo, and places information artifacts
    > under BFO:generically dependent continuants:
    > http://code.google.com/p/information-artifact-ontology/

    The uploaded and version controlled (information artifact) me might be
    somehow depend on the decesed me – perhaps otherwise than “Borges” on
    “me” in http://www.amherstlecture.org/perry2007/Borges%20and%20I.pdf ,
    but both of us may live with the consciousness that you filed (the
    uploaded) me into the category BFO:generically dependent continuants.

    But what would be the independent continuant material basis of the AI
    on the internet? A set of electrons / photons?

    On 24 November 2010 17:42, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
    > For example, we would consider “Legal person” as a role, and could
    > then define a class of material entities that bear this role. Such a
    > class does not have to be a subclass of homo sapiens.

    Persons are continuants without doubt.

    As I understand you think that

    • you as a homo sapiens are an instance of independently continuant

    material object, and

    • a legal person is a class of independently continuant material

    objects [or a class of other legal persons and independently
    continuant material objects, etc.] bearing a (dependently continuant)
    role of “legal person”.

    The question whether personship is a role has a very long history, my
    favorite contemporary texts on this history are

    http://www.amazon.com/Category-Person-Anthropology-Philosophy-History/dp/0521277574

    and

    http://www.amazon.com/Pluralism-Personality-State-Ideas-Context/dp/0521022630

    (cf. of course http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html
    esp ch. 16. and 2nd part where personship is a role and

    http://www.amazon.com/Reasons-Persons-Oxford-Paperbacks-Parfit/dp/019824908X

    on the logical construction of personship).

    If you think that you are an independently continuant material object
    bearing a role of “natural person”, then you think personship is a
    role. (Or you think that natural persons are unique among persons in
    being independently continuant material objects without bearing a
    role?)

    I think personship is not a role: roles are a kind of connection
    between persons. As I wrote above I think that persons are not
    independently continuant material objects bearing (dependently
    continuant) roles but independent continuants who do not necessarily
    and intuitively have a material basis (“Independent Continuants who
    are not necessarily Material Entities (or Boundaries or Sites)”). E.g.
    I think I am an independent continuant who is necessarily material as
    a body (of a homo sapiens) and as an individual person but not as a
    person.

    The question remains whether the Person-Object divide has ontological
    (vs. “mere” ethical) significance (like the Continuant-Occurent
    divide). If you accept (as I do) or suppose for a moment that “An
    objective fact is one that is invariant under all admissible
    transformations” (Nozick: Invariances

    http://www.amazon.com/Invariances-Structure-Objective-Robert-Nozick/dp/0674012453

    p. 82., in general in part “2. Invariance and Objectivity” pp.
    75-119., and in particular to ethics in chapter “Ethical Truth and
    Ethical Objectivity”, pp. 284-294.) you can see

    • why I insist on invariance in my ethics,
    • why I think that implementing the invariance-requirement is the way

    how we can avoid a contingent definition of person.
    My criticism of BFO “embodied” in POnt stems from the fact that I think that

    • the (hypothetical) transformation of the origin of a person (natural

    vs authored, e.g. material vs uploaded, or individual vs AI) is an
    ontological transformation, and

    • personship is invariant to this transformation as well.

    This is why I think that POnt is a pure ontology, i.e., not
    “contaminated” with ethics, and perhaps with relevance to BFO.

    Peter

    [Original: https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en ]

     

  • mazsa 16:42 on November 27, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , State   

    Re: Dear BFO Community, let me introduce you POnt – Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha 

    [Cf. the whole sequence: http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/posts-on-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha-on-bfo-list ]

    Janna Hastings
    Nov 22, 10:26 am:

    Hello,
    I am curious. Can you give a definition for Information as you’ve used it?
    Thanks
    Janna

    Mázsa Péter
    Nov 22, 11:06 am:

    On 22 November 2010 10:26, Janna Hastings wrote:
    > I am curious. Can you give a definition for Information as you’ve used it?

    Hi Janna,
    the “natural” answer is that I use it as a basic concept, i.e. without
    a definition (just like BFO uses Entity). But this does not tell the
    whole story. I use Information (vs matter) as some(thing) not
    necessarily local and/or temporal, but (like matter) likely causal
    (cf. eg. http://lesswrong.com/lw/qr/timeless_causality ).
    P.

    Barry Smith
    Nov 22, 2:18 pm:

    Your proposal, unfortunately, has the unacceptable consequence that every
    instance of material entity is an instance of information.
    I believe that if you really believe this, then DOLCE would be a more
    suitable environment for your work; or potentially also HL7 RIM.
    BS

    Mázsa Péter
    Nov 24, 12:03 pm:

    2010/11/22 Ludger Jansen:
    > Nice try. You might want to check this:
    > http://www.gap5.de/proceedings/pdf/479-491_jansen.pdf

    Thank you Ludger, I like it very much! We are pursuing the same…
    subject:) (e.g. “[...] there are non-natural persons that have no
    intelligence nor emotions of happiness or misery of there own, but
    still are agents [= persons @Jansen] to which actions and their merit
    are appropriated” Jansen,2003 p. 486.)
    Main differences:

    • I think agency is not what constitutes personship, but a necessary

    condition of it. In POnt, there may be agents who are not persons. Or,
    this is at least not excluded. (Cf. eg.

    http://www.amazon.com/Personal-Agency-Metaphysics-Mind-Action/dp/0199…

    )

    • I like your category “status persons” (“things that exist only

    because we believe them to exist” Jansen cites Searle
    “belief-dependent non-beliefs” Jansen,2003 p. 479). I think the
    concept of person is itself a “status”. In POnt, Individual (or:
    [FinesPart, Body, Individual]) is not a “natural person” but a “status
    person” as well, due to common knowledge (common knowledge as I use:
    http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/cs/pdf/0006/0006009v1.pdf pp. 14-15.).
    Natural [person] (be it a result of evolution or creation) is not
    preferred over non-natural [person] (be it a result of anyone’s
    creation or belief).

    • In POnt, there are 2 possible origins of your status objects: (1)

    States and Individuals, who are status objects because they are
    elements of a common knowledge partition of agents, based on Axiom 2
    (“2. All parts of a common knowledge partition of agents are agents”)
    and (2) ConstitutedPersons who are status objects based on Axiom 4
    (“4. All ‘persons’ declared by persons and able to speak with one
    voice are persons.”)

    • Both of us think that status persons are not, or not exclusively,

    (material) Objects. (In POnt, persons are originally not material
    Objects, however some persons, SocialPersons, are equivalent to some
    Objects, Social PersonObjects, and some ConstitutedPersons may have
    “incarnations” among Objects as well). But you are not explicit about
    it, I mean how would you implement your system in BFO 1.1, where you
    can not find a place for not necessarily material
    IndependentContinuants?
    > Personally, I would try to seperate the formal ontology of persons from the
    > person ethos thing.

    2 answers:
    1) You are right. For me, this 2 above are inseparable: I’m generating
    persons from ‘persons’ (said to be persons) in the following way:
    “1. All ‘persons’ are agents.
    2. All parts of a common knowledge partition of agents are agents.
    3. All members of a possibly fair society of agents are persons.
    4. All ‘persons’ declared by persons and able to speak with one voice
    are persons.”

    http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/axiom

    The Axiom-system is determined by the claim that the concept of person
    which is generated by it should be invariant to “any origin, natural
    or authored” and to “any consent, by common right or by constitution”.
    So the person ethos thing (the claim of invariance) determines the
    structure of Axioms.
    This unseparability is undeniably a constraint. But maybe a good kind
    of constraint: I think it makes possible to determine the meaning of
    the concept of person, without any contingency, overdetermination or
    underdetermination.
    (By the way, ethical foundation of personhood is not new, cf. e.g.
    “[...] this book will begin with an ethical assumption about the
    nature of persons, which it will then take as a critical and defining
    starting point for further metaphysical investigation into the kind
    ‘person’.” http://www.amazon.com/Bounds-Agency-Carol-Rovane/dp/0691017166
    p. 5.)
    2) Formally, you can work with the bare axioms without any reference
    to their origin. Starting from here, the formal ontology of person is
    completely separated from the person ethics thing.
    > By the way: What is a “common knowledge partition part”?

    When we speak about “common knowledge partition part”, we use Axiom 2
    above: if the set B is a part (here: element) of a partition [<==> a
    collection of disjoint nonempty subsets of the set A whose union is
    all of the set A] of a set A of agents, and the partition is common
    knowledge among the elements of the set A of agents, then the set B is
    an agent. I call B CommonKnowledgePartitionPart.
    Examles are the equivalent [FinesPart, Body, Individual] and the
    equivalent [NonFinestPart, Territory, State]
    I’m curious… what do you think?
    Peter

    Mázsa Péter
    Nov 24, 5:27 pm:

    On 22 November 2010 14:18, Barry Smith wrote:
    > Your proposal, unfortunately, has the unacceptable consequence that every
    > instance of material entity is an instance of information.
    > I believe that if you really believe this, then DOLCE would be a more
    > suitable environment for your work; or potentially also HL7 RIM.
    > BS

    Barry, I think BFO you initiated is superior to any other ontologies I
    checked – BFO is my revealed preference:)
    Regarding that both the Entity of BFO and the Information of POnt are
    basic concepts, i.e. both without definition (thanks Janna!), I do not
    insist on Information as a root category. POnt can call the root
    category Entity, so I need not give up BFO-tradition + will not lose
    generality (thanks Barry!). I may like information to be the
    “infrastucture” of matter but you are right: for an ontology this
    would be a superfluous presumption and a logical fallacy of this kind:
    http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/mary/Default.aspx .
    What is absolutely necessary for POnt is that there should be a place
    for Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material Entities
    (or Boundaries or Sites).
    Of course I am not informed enough on the history of BFO, so I am not
    able to decide whether it is a bug of BFO or a feature – hopefully a
    feature, and in this case POnt will be just a fork of BFO, not a
    suggestion for improvement of it.
    ***
    I got 2 private questions independently:
    “I still do not understand the square bracket terms in POnt.”
    “What are the brackets for?”
    Square brackets are generated by SWOOP 2.3beta4 if you declare 2
    categories to be equivalent. If ‘=’ is ‘is equivalent to’, I declared
    that State = Territory = NonFinestPart, and that Individual = Body =
    FinestPart, and that SocialPerson = SocialPersonObject =
    CommonKnowledgePartitionPart. E.g. the meaning of [State, Territory,
    NonFinestPart] (cf. http://theunitedpersons.org/pont ) is that the
    categories of State, Territory and NonFinestPart are equivalent.

    [Original: https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en ]

     

  • mazsa 09:17 on November 22, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , State   

    Dear BFO Community, let me introduce you POnt – Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha 

    [Cf. the whole sequence: http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/posts-on-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha-on-bfo-list ]

    ———- Forwarded message ———-
    From: Mázsa Péter Date: 2010/11/22
    Subject: POnt – Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha
    To: bfo-discuss@googlegroups.com

    Dear BFO Community,

    let me introduce you POnt – Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha.

    Home: http://theunitedpersons.org/pont
    Owl file: https://github.com/mazsa/Personal-Ontology/raw/master/pont.owl

    It is a modification of BFO [Basic Formal Ontology http://www.ifomis.org/bfo :

    ], based on this Constitution:

    http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution

    Motivation:
    I’m a big fan of Parts – A Study in Ontology by Simons

    http://www.amazon.com/Parts-Study-Ontology-Peter-Simons/dp/0199241465

    and BFO, and, however short it is (< 1 page), I spent a lot of time
    revealing/creating the Constitution above. I wanted to merge them all.

    My central concern was that agents and persons as defined by the
    Axioms 1-4. http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/axiom of the
    Constitution didn't fit well in BFO 1.1. I think we need a category
    for Agents: Independent Continuants who are not necessarily Material
    Entities (or Boundaries or Sites). E.g., I don't think we should
    regard Constituted Persons (e.g. corporation / universitas

    http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Universitas.html

    ) as necessarily Objects.

    Main deviation:
    This is why I must replace the root BFO-category Entity for root
    POnt-category Information:

    In POnt, (material) Objects are special
    cases of Information ( = are constrained Information), ensuring a
    place for not necessarily material independent continuants.
    (As a matter of fact, I have another motivation too: I think it may be
    useful to approach from this point of view the trade-off between
    “private ownership” of information and the “public domain”

    “Locke (1690 http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/academic/digitexts/locke/second/locke2nd.txt
    ) was one of the earliest writers to argue that ideas should be
    appropriated by those who originally produced them and thereafter
    protected for a period of time under the principle of natural law for
    the benefit of the public. He identified the trade-off between private
    ownership and the public domain”

    https://www.stanford.edu/group/song/papers/ScienceandPropertyARLSS.pdf

    )

    Implication:
    Notice that my suggestion (the replacement) implies an answer to this question:

    “[...] it is important to clarify what the problem is not. We are not
    asking whether the metaphorical interpretation of the universe as a
    computer is more useful than mislead- ing. We are not even asking
    whether an informational description of the universe, as we know it,
    is possible, at least partly and piecemeal. [...] We are asking
    whether the universe in itself could essentially be made of
    information [...]”

    http://num.math.uni-goettingen.de/schaback/info/mat/floridi_open_problems.pdf

    p. 574

    The replacement (of Entity for Information) implies that universe in
    itself could possibly essentially be made of information with natural
    processes, including causation, as special cases of it (Cf.
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_physics ).

    Notice further that

    • the replacement does not imply predetermination
    • the definition of Agent is “Freedom of some Information”
    • the basic concept “freedom” is not necessarily (but possibly)

    ontologic, it is “at least” epistemologic, i.e., the replacement does
    not exclude predetermination either – we are agnostic on this topic
    and cf. http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Free_will_(solution)

    Structure:
    Some Agents [CommonKnowledgePartitionPart
    http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/axiom/ca2 , including
    FinestPart and NonFinestPart] are equivalent to some Persons
    [SocialPerson http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/axiom/ca3 ,
    including Individual and State], based on a Theorem (which includes

    http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/PartitionIsEquivalentToAnEquivalenceRelation.html

    ).
    And these Persons are equivalent to some Objects [SocialPersonObject,
    including Body and Territory], based on a Presumption.

    Of course, some SocialPersons (States, Individuals) may have
    constitutions, and some ConstitutedPersons may have “incarnations”
    among Objects (e.g. the United Persons may affiliate some States:)

    Question:
    The replacement of Entity for Information is the main price I think we
    should pay for Persons (or for not necessarily material independent
    continuants) in our ontology. What do you think of it as the
    BFO-community?

    Thank you:
    Peter Mazsa http://mazsa.com

    [Original: https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en ]

     

  • mazsa 22:56 on November 11, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , State,   

    Which places will gain most from the next transition? 

    “The transitions to farming and to industry were associated with huge sudden increases in growth rates. Growth had remained pretty steady before each transition, and then boom, within a quarter of a previous doubling time, doubling times fell by over a factor of 150. Going by the number of doublings in these previous modes, we are already overdue for another transition. So I suspect that within a century or so we will see another such “singularity.” And since the current doubling time is about fifteen years, we should roughly expect that within a space of about five years the world economy will transition to doubling every few weeks or less.

    [...] which places will gain most from the next transition?

    [...] a [...] factor may matter most: legal and regulatory flexibility. If it is to radically remake the economy within a space of five years, this new mode will quickly run afoul of a wide range of existing laws and regulations. Places that require many years of discourse between diverse stakeholders to begin even incremental legal and regulatory changes are just not going to be where this new mode first grows big. Much more promising are places where new industries and ventures can just do things, or lobby a small set of key decision makers to quickly get big changes, and commit to keeping such changes. Random empty declarations of policy changes that could easily be soon reversed, or not enforced, won’t do either.”

    http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/11/flexible-law-wins.html

    sequel: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/11/expand-bounty-hunting.html

     

  • mazsa 19:35 on November 9, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , owl, , , , State   

    POnt Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha release 

    POnt Personal Ontology home: http://theunitedpersons.org/pont

    POnt owl file: https://github.com/mazsa/Personal-Ontology/raw/master/pont.owl

    (It is a modification of BFO, based on the Constitution)

    Ontology reader + editor: https://code.google.com/p/swoop/

    Best intro into ontology: http://www.amazon.com/Parts-Study-Ontology-Peter-Simons/dp/0199241465

    Follow up: http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/posts-on-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha-on-bfo-list

     

  • mazsa 13:33 on November 1, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , State,   

    Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions: “This paper examines whether house demolitions are an effective counterterrorism tactic against suicide terrorism. We link original longitudinal micro-level data on houses demolished by the Israeli Defense Forces with data on the universe of suicide attacks against Israeli targets. By exploiting spatial and time variation in house demolitions and suicide terror attacks during the second Palestinian uprising, we show that punitive house demolitions (those targeting Palestinian suicide terrorists and terror operatives) cause an immediate, significant decrease in the number of suicide attacks. The effect dissipates over time and by geographic distance. In contrast, we observe that precautionary house demolitions (demolitions justified by the location of the house but not related to the identity or any action of the house’s owner) cause a significant increase in the number of suicide terror attacks. The results are consistent with the view that selective violence is an effective tool to combat terrorist groups, whereas indiscriminate violence backfires.”

    http://papers.nber.org/papers/W16493

     

  • mazsa 09:23 on October 8, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , State   

    http://www.cato-unbound.org/archives/september-2010-seeing-like-a-state-a-conversation-with-james-c-scott/

     

  • mazsa 16:33 on October 1, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , secret, State, , ,   

    “Switzerland’s tax treaty with Germany may finish banking secrecy in Europe and prompt withdrawals as Swiss banks will no longer guarantee client confidentiality.

    The treaty will allow investigators to request Swiss assistance in tracking down undeclared money deposited by German nationals, said Eric Jucker, a Zurich-based tax lawyer. It probably will be signed this month by Swiss Finance Minister Hans-Rudolf Merz and his German counterpart Wolfgang Schaeuble.

    “The agreement that will come into force will go very much further on the information that can be exchanged between officials,” Jucker said. “Banking secrecy will come to an end” for clients who are not Swiss as the country adopts international tax standards, he said. [...]” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-30/swiss-tax-treaty-with-germany-may-finish-bank-secrecy-in-europe.html

    Cf. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/tag/switzerland

    http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/tag/cartel

     

  • mazsa 12:52 on September 17, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , , State   

    Pope: Atheism causes Nazism 

    “Even in our own lifetime, we can recall how Britain and her leaders stood against a Nazi tyranny that wished to eradicate God from society and denied our common humanity to many, especially the Jews, who were thought unfit to live. I also recall the regime’s attitude to Christian pastors and religious who spoke the truth in love, opposed the Nazis and paid for that opposition with their lives. As we reflect on the sobering lessons of the atheist extremism of the twentieth century, let us never forget how the exclusion of God, religion and virtue from public life leads ultimately to a truncated vision of man and of society and thus to a “reductive vision of the person and his destiny”” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2010/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20100916_incontro-autorita_en.html

    Cf. “[...] as well as religious fanaticism that in some contexts impedes the exercise of the right to religious freedom, so too the deliberate promotion of religious indifference or practical atheism on the part of many countries obstructs the requirements for the development of peoples, depriving them of spiritual and human resources. God is the guarantor of man’s true development, inasmuch as, having created him in his image, he also establishes the transcendent dignity of men and women and feeds their innate yearning to “be more”. Man is not a lost atom in a random universe: he is God’s creature, whom God chose to endow with an immortal soul and whom he has always loved. If man were merely the fruit of either chance or necessity, or if he had to lower his aspirations to the limited horizon of the world in which he lives, if all reality were merely history and culture, and man did not possess a nature destined to transcend itself in a supernatural life, then one could speak of growth, or evolution, but not development. When the State promotes, teaches, or actually imposes forms of practical atheism, it deprives its citizens of the moral and spiritual strength that is indispensable for attaining integral human development and it impedes them from moving forward with renewed dynamism as they strive to offer a more generous human response to divine love. In the context of cultural, commercial or political relations, it also sometimes happens that economically developed or emerging countries export this reductive vision of the person and his destiny to poor countries. This is the damage that “superdevelopment” causes to authentic development when it is accompanied by “moral underdevelopment”.” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html#29.

    vs.

    “The notion that it was the atheism of Nazis (who were mostly not atheists in any case) that led to their extremist and hateful views or that somehow fuels intolerance in Britain today is a terrible libel against those who do not believe in god. The notion that it is non-religious people in the UK today who want to force their views on others, coming from a man whose organisation exerts itself internationally to impose its narrow and exclusive form of morality and undermine the human rights of women, children, gay people and many others, is surreal.” http://www.humanism.org.uk/news/view/647

    Cf. “Why was the line “(who were mostly not atheists in any case)” removed from your article [ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11332515 ]? Even if that line had not been in the quote (which it was) surely it is your duty and obligation to the public to make it clear that Hitler and the majority of the Nazis were Catholics? Are you trying to distort the facts and lead people to believe the Nazi’s were atheists? Surely comparing any group to Nazis is the worst insult which can be made. If you think about it why would atheists want to kill only Jews, homosexuals, intellectuals and non-whites?” http://richarddawkins.net/discussions/519631-bbc-unfair-reporting-and-bias

     

  • mazsa 09:59 on May 17, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , State, , ,   

    The inescapable trilemma of the world economy: “Sometimes simple and bold ideas help us see more clearly a complex reality that requires nuanced approaches. I have an “impossibility theorem” for the global economy that is like that. It says that democracy, national sovereignty and global economic integration are mutually incompatible: we can combine any two of the three, but never have all three simultaneously and in full.

    Here is what the theorem looks like in a picture:

    [...]”

    http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2007/06/the-inescapable.html

     

  • mazsa 17:04 on May 5, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , State, ,   

    The European Tax Cartel and Switzerland’s Role, http://www.institutconstant.ch/pdf/IC-Tax_Cartel.pdf , Summary:

    • Most European States expect to record high increases in public spending, due to the lack of adaptation of social dependency programs in the face of demographic change. The taxpayers’ fiscal exhaustion leads some Member States to use the European Union to centralize and standardize tax systems in order to render less competitive those countries deemed too attractive for capital or residents, increasingly encouraged to “vote with their feet”.
    • Tax centralization at European Union level progresses at a much faster pace than is generally perceived. High minimal rates for the VAT, which represents more than one third of all tax revenues, the standardization of excise taxes and tariffs, the Savings Tax Directive and the project of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for corporate income taxes are all examples suggestive of the extent to which the European tax cartel is already a reality. The EU makes use of such dubious concepts as “harmful tax competition” or “fiscal state aid” in order to attack less penalizing tax regimes, as in the case of the current tax dispute with Switzerland.
    • Arguments in favor of tax standardization generally rely on an erroneous conception of the functioning of markets and ignore the negative effects of the State’s fiscal weight and the role of tax planning in the international allocation of capital. Thus, “fair competition” as advocated by the European Commission through tax standardization is nothing more than a form of protectionism. Fiscal diversity, far from endangering the financing of “public goods” provided by the State, tends on the contrary to improve their relation to the tax burden. Diversity also leads to efficiency gains in international capital markets.
    • Fiscal diversity places some limits on an excessive tax burden and thus favors capital accumulation at the source of innovation and economic progress. It leads to greater overall prosperity than under a standardized tax regime. Tax competition is also an essential condition for institutional innovation by allowing comparisons between countries and the emulation of best practices. Finally, fiscal diversity is a necessary bulwark for individual freedom and legitimate rights by restraining the potential for abuse of the monopoly of force intrinsic to the State and by making “voting with one’s feet” easier.
    • In view of the dangers involved in the cartelization of tax systems in Europe, Switzerland continues to play an essential role. Switzerland’s enlightened dissidence contributes significantly to the preservation and increase of productive capital while enhancing individual rights and choices, in the interest of all Europeans and the future of Europe.
     

  • mazsa 14:05 on March 25, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , State   

    A story of political equivalence in logical order 

    [The current version: http://j.mp/ius-inter-personae]

    [The version 6750:]

    Ius inter personae

    The story of political equivalence in logical (not necessarily historical) order:

    1. us vs. them

    1.1. partition of a set of humans into 2 parts (members of a society of humans vs. not members)

    1.1.0. humans are members or not members of a given society of humans

    1.1.1. we as members of our society (e.g. our group or tribe) are equivalent to each other
    (based on that http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/partition-is-necessary-and-sufficient-for-equivalence )

    1.1.1.1. they (the not members) are equivalent to each other and they are less than we are

    2. cuius regio eius religio (1555.09.25)

    2.1. partition of a set of humans into more than 2 parts

    2.1.0. humans are members of one of the societies of humans

    2.1.1. members of a society in a regio are equivalent to each other
    members of a part of the partition of humans, i.e. humans in a regio, are equivalent to each other
    (based on that http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/partition-is-necessary-and-sufficient-for-equivalence )

    • “Gesellschaft” Tönnies,1887

    2.1.1.1 they, regio by regio, are equivalent to each other and they can be ranked, regio by regio

    3. cuius regio eius religio (1555) + ius inter gentes (1532)

    parts of the partition of humans, i.e. states, are agents

    3.1. states as agents and humans as members of states as agents are partitioned

    3.1.0. humans are members of one of the states

    3.1.1. inter-state order (1648.10.24)
    (states are members of the inter-state order: they are “inter-states”)
    (based on 3.1. and http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/partition-is-necessary-and-sufficient-for-equivalence )
    a set of states as agents are equivalent to each other

    all states as agents are equivalent to each other (1960.12.14)

    3.1.1.1. nationalism

    3.1.2. humans as members of states as agents are equivalent to each other

    3.1.00. Partitioned (and equivalent) are:

    • states as agents,
    • humans as members of states as agents
    • - e.g. humans as members of state1 as an agent, and
    • - humans as members of state2 as an agent, …

    3.2. [declared] persons are declared by the states as agents or by humans as members of states as agents and able to speak with one voice by means of the states as agents

    4. cuius regio eius religio (1555) + ius inter gentes (1532) + ius gentium (160)

    humans are agents
    (humans are agents not based on a hypothetical ius inter homines but on ius inter gentes + ius gentium)

    4.1. humans as members of states and humans as agents are partitioned

    4.1.0. humans are members of humanity

    4.1.1. (3.1.1.)

    4.1.2. (3.1.2.)

    4.1.3. human rights (1776.07.04)
    humans as agents are equivalent to each other (while humans as members of states as agents are equivalent to each other based on 3.1.2.)
    (the equivalence of humans is not based on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Golden_Rule but on the partition of states as agents and humans as agents)
    theorethical scope: an inter-state (the United States)

    practical scope: an inter-state (the United States, 1789.03.04)

    theorethical scope: global (1948.12.10)

    practical scope: global: (not yet)

    4.1.3.1. cosmopolitanism

    4.1.00. Partitioned (and equivalent) are:

    • states as agents,
    • humans as members of persons as agents
    • - e.g. humans as members of state1 as an agent,
    • - humans as members of state2 as an agent, …, and
    • humans as agents.

    4.2. [declared] persons are declared by agents (e.g. states or humans) as agents or by humans as members of states as agents and able to speak with one voice by agents as agents

    5. cuius regio eius religio (1555) + ius inter gentes (1532) + ius gentium (160) + ius inter personae (2008.08.27)

    states are persons
    (based on 3. and 3.1.1. and http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/axiom/ca3 )
    humans are persons
    (based on 4. and 4.1.3. and http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/axiom/ca3 )
    [there can be other "social" persons as well based on http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/axiom/ca3 ]
    declared persons based on http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/axiom/ca4 are persons

    5.0.1. persons can be persons as agents
    e.g. states can be states as agents (cf. 3. and 5.), humans can be humans as agents (cf. 4. and 5.)

    5.0.2. persons (optionally: as something/somebody) can be persons as persons
    (based on http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/preamble/cp4 and http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/declaration/cd2 )
    e.g. declared persons can be declared by persons as persons and can be able to speak with one voice by persons as persons

    5.1.0. persons can be members of persons
    (based on http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/preamble/cp2 and http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/statement/cs2 and http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/declaration/cd2 )
    e.g. persons can be members of persons as agents (based on 3 and 3.1.0. and 5.)
    e.g. persons as persons can be members of persons as persons (based on 5.0.2. and 5.1.0)

    5.1.0.1. members of persons as persons are persons as persons
    (based on 5.1.0. and http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/preamble/cp4 and http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/declaration/cd2 )
    e.g. members of states as persons are persons (e.g. humans) as persons

    5.1.1. (3.1.1.)

    5.1.2. (3.1.2.)

    5.1.3. (4.1.3.)

    5.1.4. persons as persons are equivalent to each other
    (based on http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/statement/cs4 and http://theunitedpersons.org/constitution/declaration/cd2 )
    specifically, states as persons and humans as persons and declared persons as persons are equivalent to each other
    e.g. persons as persons and its members are equivalent (based on 5.1.0.1. and 5.1.4.)

    • “Personschaft” or “Personenschaft” (vs. “Gesellschaft” vs. “Gemeinschaft” of Tönnies,1887)

    5.1.00. Partitioned (and equivalent) are:

    • persons as agents
    • - e.g. states as agents, and
    • - humans as agents, and
    • persons as members of persons as agents
    • - e.g. humans as members of state1 as an agent,
    • - humans as members of state2 as an agent, …, and
    • persons (e.g. states and humans and declared persons) as persons.

    (based on 3.1.1. and 3.1.2 and 4.1.3 and 5.1.4. and http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/partition-is-necessary-and-sufficient-for-equivalence )

     

  • mazsa 09:00 on March 24, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , , State   

    Pastor Niemöller spoke for the thousands and thousands of men like me when he spoke (too modestly of himself) and said that, when the Nazis attacked the Communists, he was a little uneasy, but, after all, he was not a Communist, and so he did nothing; and then they attacked the Socialists, and he was a little uneasier, but, still, he was not a Socialist, and he did nothing; and then the schools, the press, the Jews, and so on, and he was always uneasier, but still he did nothing. And then they attacked the Church, and he was a Churchman, and he did something—but then it was too late.

    You remember those early meetings of your department in the university when, if one had stood, others would have stood, perhaps, but no one stood. A small matter, a matter of hiring this man or that, and you hired this one rather than that. You remember everything now, and your heart breaks. Too late. You are compromised beyond repair.

    Milton Mayer
     

  • mazsa 12:00 on March 23, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , State   

    “A partition of a set A is a collection of disjoint nonempty subsets of A whose union is all of A.

    “Studying equivalence relations on a set A and studying partitions of A are really the same thing. Given any partition D of A, there is exactly one equivalence relation on A from which it is derived.

    “The proof is not difficult. To show that the partition D comes from some equivalence relation, let us define a relation C on A setting xCy if x and y belong to the same element of D. Symmetry of C is obvious; reflexivity follows from the fact that the union of the elements of D equals all of A; transitivity follows from the fact that distinct elements of D are disjoint. It is simple to check that the collection of equivalence classes determined by C is precisely the collection D.

    “To show there is only one such equivalence relation, suppose that C1 and C2 are two equivalence relations on A that give rise to the same collection of equivalence classes D. Given x is an element of A, we show that yC1x if and only if yC2x, from which we conclude that C1 = C2. Let E1 be the equivalence class determined by x relative to the relation C1; let E2 be the equivalence class determined by x relative to the relation C2. Then E1 is an element of D, so that it must equal the unique element D of D that contains x. Similarly, E2 must equal D. Now by definition, E1 consists of all y such that yC1x; and E2 consists of all y such that yC2x. Since E1 = D = E2, our result is proved.” Munkres,2000, pp. 23-24.

     

  • mazsa 12:00 on March 8, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , Polling, , State   

    “Four in five adults (79%) regard internet access as their fundamental right, according to a new global poll conducted across 26 countries for BBC World Service.

    The poll [...] found that 87 per cent of those who used the internet felt that internet access should be “the fundamental right of all people.” More than seven in ten (71%) non-internet users also felt that they should have the right to access the web. [...]

    The poll also showed that most internet users feel that the internet should not be regulated by governments. More than half (53%) of internet users agreed that “the internet should never be regulated by any level of government anywhere”—including large majorities in South Korea (83%), Nigeria (77%), and Mexico (72%). [...]

    The poll also found that fraud was the aspect of the internet that caused people most concern, with 32 per cent saying it was what worried them most. Fraud emerged as a greater public concern than violent and explicit content, which was mentioned by 27 per cent, and threats to privacy, which were the major concern of one in five people (20%). [...]

    The results are drawn from a survey of 27,973 adult citizens across 26 countries, including 14,306 internet users, conducted for BBC World Service by the international polling firm GlobeScan. GlobeScan coordinated fieldwork, involving telephone and in-person interviews, between 30 November 2009 and 7 February 2010.

    GlobeScan Chairman Doug Miller commented: “Despite worries about privacy and fraud, people around the world see access to the internet as their fundamental right. They think the web is a force for good, and most don’t want governments to regulate it.” http://globescan.com/news_archives/bbc2010_internet/ via http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8548190.stm The findings in detail: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/08_03_10_BBC_internet_poll.pdf

     

  • mazsa 19:53 on March 2, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , , , , State   

    On the illegitimate titles for the reduction of the aborigines of the New
 World into the power of the Spaniards

    “[…] some have maintained that grace is the title to dominion and
 consequently that sinners, at any rate those in mortal sin, have no
 dominion over anything. [...] Mortal sin does not preclude civil ownership of the true kind. [...] the aborigines 
undoubtedly had true dominion in both public and private matters, just like
 Christians, and that neither their princes nor private persons could be
 despoiled of their property on the ground of their not being true owners. It 
would be harsh to deny to those, who have never done any wrong, what we 
grant to Saracens and Jews, who are the persistent enemies of Christianity.
 We do not deny that these latter peoples are true owners of their property, 
if they have not seized lands elsewhere belonging to Christians.

    “It remains to ask whether the Indians lacked ownership because of
 want of reason or unsoundness of mind. […] The Indian aborigines are not barred on this ground from the exercise of 
true dominion. This is proved from the fact that the true state of the case
 is that they are not of unsound mind, but have, according to their kind, the 
use of reason. This is clear, because there is a certain method in their
 affairs, for they have polities which are orderly arranged and they have 
definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops, and a
 system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason; they also have 
a kind of religion. Further, they make no error in matters which are
 self-evident to others; this is witness to their use of reason.”

    On the lawful titles whereby the aborigines of America could have cone into
 the power of Spain

    “The Spaniards may lawfully carry on trade among the
native Indians, so long as they do no harm to their country, as, for 
instance, by importing thither wares which the natives lack and by
 exporting thence either gold or silver or other wares of which the native s
have abundance. Neither may the native princes hinder their subjects from carrying on trade with the Spanish; nor, on the other hand, may the princes
 of Spain prevent commerce with the natives.

    “[…] inasmuch as things that belong to nobody are acquired by the 
first occupant according to the law of nations (Inst., 2, 1, 12), it follows 
that if there be in the earth gold or in the sea pearls or in a river 
anything else which is not appropriated by the law of nations those will
 vest in the first occupant, just as the fish in the sea do.

    “If the Indian natives wish to prevent the Spaniards
 from enjoying any of their above-named rights under the law of nations, for 
instance, trade or other above-named matter, the Spaniards ought in the 
first place to use reason and persuasion in order to remove scandal and
 ought to show in all possible methods that they do not come to the hurt of 
the natives, but wish to sojourn as peaceful guests and to travel without
 doing the natives any harm; -and they ought to show this not only by word,
 but also by reason, according to the saying, “It behoveth the prudent to
make trial of everything by words first.” But if, after this recourse to 
reason, the barbarians decline to agree and propose to use force, the 
Spaniards can defend themselves and do all that consists with their own
 safety, it being lawful to repel force by force. And not only so, but, if 
safety can not otherwise be had, they may build fortresses and defensive 
works, and, if they have sustained a wrong, they may follow it up with war
 on the authorization of their sovereign and may avail themselves of the
 other rights of war. The proof hereof lies in the fact that warding-off and
 avenging a wrong make a good cause of war, as said above, following St.
Thomas (Secunda Secundæ, qu. 40). But when the Indians deny the Spaniards their rights under the law of nations they do them a wrong. Therefore, if it be necessary, in order to preserve their right, that they should go to war, they may lawfully do so. [...]

    “
There is no inconsistency, indeed, in holding the war to be a just war on
 both sides, seeing that on one side there is right and on the other side
 there is invincible ignorance. […]



    “If after recourse to alt other measures, the 
Spaniards are unable to obtain safety as regards the native Indians, save by
 seizing their cities and reducing them to subjection, they may lawfully
 proceed to these extremities. The proof lies in the fact that “peace and
 safety are the end and aim of war,” as St. Augustine says, writing to 
Boniface. And since it is now lawful for the Spaniards, as has been said, to
 wage defensive war or even if necessary offensive war, therefore, everything
 necessary to secure the end and aim of war, namely, the obtaining of safety
 and peace, is lawful.
”

    Francisco de Vitoria, 1532: De Indis, Part 2,
    http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/De_Indis_De_Jure_Belli/Part_2

     

    • mazsa 20:06 on March 2, 2010 Permalink | Reply

      “Hudgins could argue that the analogy with the Kelo decision doesn’t make sense because this is tribal property, not individual property. OK. So imagine that some civilization more technologically advanced than ours discovers that there’s a rare mineral below the hills and mountains of Yosemite, which, in a sense, is tribal property. Our government has refused to sell. To get at the mineral, this other “civilization” must blast and bulldoze Yosemite down to nothing. If that more advanced group comes in and uses violence to grab Yosemite, would Hudgins say that was fine? I think not.” http://original.antiwar.com/henderson/2010/01/10/in-defense-of-avatar/

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