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  • mazsa 13:56 on June 7, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , Logic, ,   

    INFORMATION AND ITS METRIC “When one speaks of information one refers to that entity shared by all sources that are equivalent up to recoding. This observation suggests a definition of information. Information of the source S is the equivalence class of all recodings of the symbol sequences from S. This is noteworthy since information generally is left undefined in information theory. Information theory only considers the amount of information or rates of production, loss, and transmission, as measured by various entropies. [...]

    Recoding R partitions the space I of unique information sources into mutually disjoint subsets. [...]

    This suggests the definition of the more abstract information space I [...] as the set of equivalence classes of I under recodings R. [...] Elements of shall be denoted X, Y, and so on. [...] The elements of I shall be the objects of interest in the following. The necessary logical distinction between the class X and its constituent sources will be blurred in the following. A reference to X as an information source should be construed as connoting the common properties of its members. As a source, X is the generic source. We can speak, in a similar vein, of the events or measurements of source X. [...]

    Theorem: d is a metric and (I, d) is a metric space. [...]

    The theorem indicates that the space of information sources has quite a bit of topological structure. For example, the notion of [epsilon]-balls of “close” information sources, the continuity of functions on information sources, and the limits and convergence of sequences of information sources, can be developed. These and numerical computations of information distances will follow in a sequel. [...]

    CONCLUDING REMARKS

    One question that arises in this development is why not simply use mutual information instead of the information metric. Aside from the pseudo-geometric picture we have presented, we note that the former measures only a kind of informational correlation. The information metric, however, quantifies the degree of recoding equivalence. And so, it provides some insight into the nature of information itself. Mutual information is a derivative concept that simply reflects the properties Shannon entropy and no more.

    The foregoing mathematical development instantiates a particular philosophical view- point, that of phenomenology. All that an observer has to work with in developing an understanding of the world are finite measurements and the attendant information. This intrinsic finiteness derives first and foremost from the limited computation resources available to an observer in a finite space-time region. The information space, as developed here, is the substrate for all perception, quantification, and modeling building. This is then structured with the pseudo-geometry as we have just shown. Only under suitable restrictions is one justified in using observations to form probabilities via (say) frequencies of events.

    Information theory was founded on a quantitative measure of the amount of information. The foregoing has given a formal definition of information itself in terms of the equivalence class structure of sources. But what of the “meaning” of this information? A motivation of this work, unstated until this point, was the conviction that an understanding of the topological structure of the metric lattice of inferential logic is necessary for developing a quantitative measure of meaning and of context. Thus, we offer no immediate answer to the question, only the hope that progress can be made. We shall return to this question in the future.”

    @inproceedings{crutchfield1990information,
    title={Information and Its Metric},
    author={Crutchfield, JP},
    booktitle={Nonlinear structures in physical systems: pattern formation, chaos, and waves: proceedings of the Second Woodward Conference, San Jose State University, November 17-18, 1989},
    pages={119},
    year={1990},
    organization={Springer}
    }

    Download: http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=2410770660010935934

     
  • mazsa 09:13 on April 12, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: Logic,   

    Edmund Gettier, 1963: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

    Various attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone’s knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following:1

    a. S knows that P IFF [i.e., if and only if]
    i. P is true,
    ii. S believes that P, and
    iii. S is justified in believing that P.

    For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge:2

    b. S knows that P IFF
    i. S accepts P,
    ii. S has adequate evidence for P, and
    iii. P is true.

    Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as follows:3

    c. S knows that P IFF
    i. P is true,
    ii. S is sure that P is true, and
    iii. S has the right to be sure that P is true.

    I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if ‘has adequate evidence for’ or ‘has the right to be sure that’ is substituted for ‘is justified in believing that’ throughout.

    I shall begin by noting two points.
    First, in that sense of ‘justified’ in which S’s being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S’s knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false.
    Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.

    Keeping these two points in mind, I shall now present two cases in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition.

    Case I
    Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:

    d. Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

    Smith’s evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:

    e. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

    Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.

    But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.

    Case II
    Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:

    f. Jones owns a Ford.

    Smith’s evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith’s memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place names quite at random and constructs the following three propositions:

    g. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.

    h. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.

    i. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

    Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which be has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions, Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is.

    But imagine now that two further conditions hold.
    First Jones does not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car.
    And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is.

    If these two conditions hold, then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.

    These two examples show that definition (a) does not state a sufficient condition for someone’s knowing a given proposition. The same cases, with appropriate changes, will suffice to show that neither definition (b) nor definition (c) do so either.

    Notes
    1. Plato seems to be considering some such definition at Theaetetus 201, and perhaps accepting one at Meno 98.
    2. Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 16.
    3. A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1956), p. 34

    http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=203979522511045464

     
  • mazsa 10:18 on March 1, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: Logic, , ,   

    The Utility of Mathematics: “This essay discusses the best current understanding of the relationship between mathematical and empirical knowledge. It focuses on two questions:

    • Does mathematics have some sort of deep metaphysical connection with reality, and
    • if not, why is it that mathematical abstractions seem so often to be so powerfully predictive in the real world?” http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/utility-of-math/
     
  • mazsa 08:06 on December 20, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , , , Logic, , , , ,   

    Posts on Personal Ontology 1.0 alpha on BFO-list 

    Posts:

    0. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/pont

    1. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    2. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    3. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    4. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-re-re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    5. http://theunitedpersons.org/blog/re-re-re-re-dear-bfo-community-let-me-introduce-you-pont-personal-ontology-1-0-alpha

    Original:

    https://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/browse_thread/thread/433bfa9718cae15?hl=en

     
  • mazsa 06:21 on November 29, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , Logic, ,   

    Natural Law. A Logical Analysis: Summary “Anarchocapitalism, at least in its Rothbardian version, presupposes the existence of a natural order or law of human affairs. First, there is a brief discussion of the distinction between orders of natural and orders of artificial persons. This is followed by a partial analysis of the notion of law as an order of persons. The analysis is presented as a formal axiomatic theory. Then the notion of a natural person as well as the postulates that we need for a description of natural law as an order of natural persons are introduced within that formal theory of the law of persons. The last two sections discuss various ways in which the theory of natural law can be linked to descriptions of human affairs, and contrast the anarchocapitalists’ view of the order of the human world with the alternatives that have come to dominate political and social thought.” http://www2.units.it/~etica/2003_2/vandun.pdf

     
  • mazsa 22:00 on September 22, 2010 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , Logic,   

    From this proposition it will follow, when arithmetical addition has been defined, that 1+1=2.
    —Principia Mathematica, Volume I, page 360.

    “Inspired by Whitehead and Russell’s monumental Principia Mathematica, the Metamath Proof Explorer has over 8,000 completely worked out proofs, starting from the very foundation that mathematics is built on and eventually arriving at familiar mathematical facts and beyond. Each proof is pieced together with razor-sharp precision using a simple substitution rule that practically anyone (with lots of patience) can follow, not just mathematicians. Every step can be drilled down deeper and deeper into the labyrinth until axioms of logic and set theory—the starting point for all of mathematics—will ultimately be found at the bottom. You could spend literally days exploring the astonishing tangle of logic leading, say, from the seemingly mundane theorem 2+2=4 back to these axioms.

    Essentially everything that is possible to know in mathematics can be derived from a handful of axioms known as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, which is the culmination of many years of effort to isolate the essential nature of mathematics and is one of the most profound achievements of mankind.

    The Metamath Proof Explorer starts with these axioms to build up its proofs. There may be symbols that are unfamiliar to you, but we show in detail how they are manipulated in the proofs, and in principle you don’t have to know what they mean. In fact, there is a philosophy called formalism which says that mathematics is a game of symbols with no intrinsic meaning. With that in mind, Metamath lets you watch the game being played and the pieces manipulated according to simple and precise rules, one step at a time.

    As humans, we observe interesting patterns in these “meaningless” symbol strings as they evolve from the axioms, and we attach meaning to them. One result is the set of natural numbers, whose properties match those we observe when we count everyday objects, and their extensions to rational and real numbers. Of course, numbers were discovered centuries before set theory, and historically they were “reversed engineered” back to the axioms of set theory. The proof of 2 + 2 = 4 shows what was involved in that reverse engineering, representing the work of many mathematicians from Dedekind to von Neumann. At the other extreme of abstraction is the theory of infinite sets or transfinite cardinal numbers. Some of the world’s most brilliant mathematicians have given us deep insight into this mysterious and wondrous universe, which is sometimes called “Cantor’s paradise.”

    Metamath’s formal proofs are much more detailed than the proofs you see in textbooks. They are broken down into the most explicit detail possible so that you can see exactly what is going on. Each proof step represents a microscopic increment towards the final goal. But each step is derived from previous ones with a very simple rule, and you can verify for yourself the correctness of any proof with very little skill. All you need is patience. With no prior knowledge of advanced mathematics or even any mathematics at all, you can jump into the middle of any proof, from the most elementary to the most advanced, and understand immediately how the symbols were mechanically manipulated to go from one proof step to another, even if you don’t know what the symbols themselves mean. In the next section we show you how.”

    http://us.metamath.org/mpegif/mmset.html

     
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